

AI-Generated Explicit Deepfakes Damage Politicians' Perceived Leadership Competence, Trustworthiness and Electoral Prospects

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Abstract

The rise of generative AI has made it easier than ever to produce hyperrealistic but entirely false imagery. One especially harmful use is the creation of non-consensual, sexually explicit deepfakes depicting real people. While such content clearly violates privacy, its broader political implications remain underexplored. This paper investigates how sexually explicit AI-generated imagery affects public perceptions of politicians and broader democratic outcomes. Drawing on a pre-registered survey experiment in the U.S. ($N = 1904$), we exposed participants to either explicit, private, or control images of a fictitious male or female politician embedded in a mock social media feed. The results indicate that explicit deepfakes significantly diminish candidate evaluations, particularly with respect to affect, trustworthiness, perceived competence and leadership qualities. Exposure to AI-generated non-consensual intimate imagery (NCII) further leads to lower voting intentions for the targeted politician, illustrating how reputational harm can translate into electoral consequences. Contrary to expectations, male politicians were more strongly affected by these negative shifts in perception. However, we find no evidence that exposure to such content reduces participants' own political ambition. These findings highlight the reputational risks posed by synthetic intimate media and highlight the urgent need to mitigate its potential threats to democratic processes.

Keywords: Deepfakes, Artificial Intelligence, Politicians, Leadership, Social Media, Disinformation, Survey Experiment

1. Introduction

Artificial intelligence now enables the creation of synthetic audiovisual content that appears convincingly real. One of the most concerning applications of this technology is the fabrication of non-consensual, sexually explicit material featuring real individuals – so-called *deepfake pornography* or *AI-generated non-consensual intimate imagery (NCII)*. Widely condemned for its violation of privacy, such imagery also has the potential to inflict significant reputational harm on targeted individuals. Perhaps even more alarmingly, the vast majority of victims are women (Kikerpill, 2020), raising urgent concerns about gendered disinformation and its broader implications for gender equality in public positions.

Recent high-profile cases highlight the expanding misuse of AI in the production of NCII, with public figures emerging as frequent targets: in early 2024, more than a dozen sexually explicit deepfakes of singer-songwriter Taylor Swift circulated widely on social media, attracting millions of views (the, 2024). This incident reflects a broader pattern, with entertainment figures such as Scarlett Johansson and Nicolas Cage among the many public figures affected (Johnson, 2024). One of the most prominent platforms facilitating this type of content, 'Mr Deepfakes', hosted over 55,000 synthetic pornographic videos – 95.3% of which depicted female public figures – prior to its recent shutdown (Kikerpill, 2020; New York Post, 2025).

Now, the proliferation of AI-generated NCII has increasingly

spilled over to the political sphere. New Zealand Member of Parliament, Laura McClure, responded to a deep fake attack by displaying the image of herself in Parliament to demand regulatory action (McClure, 2024). In the United States, Democratic House Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez was targeted in early 2024 when AI-generated nude images of her circulated on the platform X (Helmore, 2024). Across Europe, fabricated pornographic content depicting female politicians – including Finland's former Prime Minister Sanna Marin, French politicians Marine Le Pen and Marion Maréchal, and Sweden's Deputy Prime Minister Ebba Busch – has been discovered on major deepfake websites (Kikerpill, 2020). UK politicians such as Deputy Prime Minister Angela Rayner (Waterson, 2024) and Irish Social Democratic and Labour Party politician Cara Hunter (Scott, 2024) have also become victims of deepfake pornography. These attacks illustrate how synthetic NCII can be weaponized to shame, discredit, or intimidate public officials, particularly women and women of color.

1.1. Deepfakes, Visual Dominance, and the Persistence of False Memories

Even before the proliferation of generative AI, politicians' reputation has been particularly vulnerable to the circulation of NCII, which reference an especially blatant type of moral transgressions. Sexual objectification undermines perceptions of honesty, competence (Smith et al., 2018) and intelligence,

with more negative emotion experienced toward subjects of objectification (Glick et al., 2005). Such judgments are especially pronounced for women and extend to assessments of leadership and moral character (Daniels and Zurbriggen, 2016; Heflick and Goldenberg, 2009).

By rendering synthetic NCII of individuals readily accessible to broad audiences, the rapid spread of generative AI contributes to the diffusion of a potent weapon for damaging the reputations of public figures. While scholarly and public concern about synthetic media has grown in recent years (Citron and Franks, 2019; Rini and Cohen, 2022), empirical research on the reputational and political effects of deepfakes remains limited. Most existing studies have focused on technical detection (Bray et al., 2023; Mai et al., 2023), legal implications, or general attitudes toward misinformation (Ecker et al., 2014, 2022). In the political arena, where success is tied to the court of public opinion, and electoral decisions often rest on subjective impressions of trust, integrity, and competence (Winsvold et al., 2024), deepfakes referencing moral transgressions represent a novel threat that can severely harm political prospects Dan (2025).

Crucially, AI-generated NCII may damage a candidate's perceived electability even when viewers are aware that it is fabricated. The psychological mechanisms involved render AI-generated NCII particularly potent and insidious, as their hyper-realistic nature can bypass rational filtering and contribute to the formation of false or distorted memories (Murphy and Flynn, 2022; Newman et al., 2022). Visual information tends to dominate human perception and memory, a tendency known as the "Colavita visual dominance effect" (Hancock and Bailenson, 2021; Sundar et al., 2021). As deepfakes draw largely on real imagery and mimic naturalistic cues, they can appear exceptionally realistic – blurring the lines between fact and fiction in a way that is qualitatively different from written disinformation or simple photoshopped images. Consequently, viewers often fail to distinguish real from synthetic faces or voices, even when explicitly warned (Dobber et al., 2021; Nightingale and Farid, 2022; Lewis et al., 2023).

On social media platforms like X, Instagram, and TikTok, visual content is more likely to be encountered, shared, and re-shared than text alone, which increases the likelihood of repeated exposure to deepfakes (Pancer and Poole, 2016) and bolsters their deceptive potency (Murphy and Flynn, 2022). Termed the "illusory truth" effect (Swire et al., 2017; Zajonc, 1968; Dechêne et al., 2010), familiarity with visual content increases its perceived credibility, even when individuals recognize it as false (Pennycook et al., 2018). Once memories are encoded, belief-revision is notoriously difficult; misperceptions often survive corrections through belief perseverance and retrieval fluency (Newman et al., 2022). As Murphy and Flynn (2022, p. 481) pointedly note, beyond creating a situation in which "seeing is believing", deepfake imagery may thus foster a situation in which "seeing is remembering". This effect is particularly problematic among older adults, who are both more susceptible to misinformation and more likely to vote (Brashier and Schacter, 2020; Tucciarelli et al., 2022).

1.2. The Reputational and Political Costs of Sexualized Deepfakes

To examine how AI-generated NCII affects political outcomes, we address three key research questions: (1) What is the impact of sexually explicit, AI-generated images on public perceptions of targeted politicians? (2) Does this impact differ by the politician's gender? (3) How do sexually explicit images compare to non-explicit private images in shaping public evaluations?

Evaluations of political leaders hinge on traits – competence, trustworthiness, and moral integrity (Funk, 1999) – that are difficult to reconcile with sexualized portrayals. Research on sexualization and attributed competence shows that individuals depicted in revealing or sexualized imagery are judged more negatively in terms of honesty, trustworthiness, competence, and electability (Smith et al., 2018). They are also associated with lower intelligence and met with more negative affective responses, such as shame or disgust (Glick et al., 2005). Research suggests that voters penalize candidates for less severe instances of perceived impropriety, such as minor gaffes or ambiguous wrongdoing (Brody and Shapiro, 1989; Chanley et al., 2000; Maier, 2011). Sexually explicit deepfakes, as an extreme and hyper-realistic form of sexual objectification, may activate similar evaluative heuristics (Daniels and Zurbriggen, 2016; Heflick and Goldenberg, 2009), eroding affect towards the candidate, perceptions of trust, competence, and leadership prototypicality (i.e., the extent to which an individual is perceived as embodying traits and behaviors associated with effective leadership; Cronshaw and Lord, 1987). Moreover, as exposure to sexually explicit deepfakes may unconsciously lead viewers to draw negative conclusions about the depicted individual, it may produce downstream effects on politicians' electoral prospects.

1.3. The Gendered Effect of Deepfake Backlash

We expect sexually explicit deepfakes to impose disproportionately greater reputational costs on female than on male candidates. Women are sexualized more frequently in media representations, and such objectification consistently depresses attributions of intelligence and moral character (Heflick and Goldenberg, 2009; Heflick et al., 2011; Daniels and Zurbriggen, 2016). Role congruity theory holds that women who violate gender norms face stronger penalties in leadership evaluations (Eagly and Karau, 2002), as do those who deviate from communal expectations (Rudman and Glick, 2001). Complementing these insights, expectancy violations theory suggests that when members of stereotypically "morally virtuous" groups – such as women – breach socially constructed expectations, they incur disproportionately negative evaluations (Žemojtel Piotrowska et al., 2016; Burgoon, 1978). In the political domain, where women are often perceived as more honest and morally upright than men (Barnes and Beaulieu, 2014; Kahn, 1992), such expectations elevate the reputational costs of perceived moral transgressions for women. Held to a higher moral standard, objectively similar behavior is judged more harshly when committed by a woman (Biernat and Manis, 1994; Žemojtel Piotrowska et al., 2016,?; Barnes et al., 2020). Thus, exposure to sexually

explicit deepfakes is likely to exacerbate existing gendered biases, producing harsher evaluations across the core dimensions that shape electoral viability.

Across outcomes, we expect an overall treatment gradient: the more blatant the moral transgression, the greater the expected reputational damage. Accordingly, we predict that sexually explicit images will more strongly depress candidate evaluations and electability compared to private (non-explicit) images. The gradient is grounded in evidence on the dehumanization processes triggered by sexualized depictions (Heflick and Goldenberg, 2009; Heflick et al., 2011; Daniels and Zurbriggen, 2016). By visually simulating moral transgression and extreme objectification, sexually explicit deepfakes can amplify these effects. Conversely, the impact of private, non-explicit deepfakes may be more ambivalent. While signaling a breach of privacy, they can also enhance perceptions of relatability (Gray et al., 2011; Fasoli et al., 2018).

1.4. Emotional Spillovers and Political Deterrents

Beyond its direct impact on voter evaluations and electoral outcomes, we expect AI-generated NCII to exert an indirect deterrent effect on political representation. Exposure to such attacks can elicit broader emotional responses in the public, such as disgust or fear, which may deter political participation – particularly among women and members of marginalized communities (Sobieraj, 2020; Håkansson, 2024). Hence, we expect that compared to the control group, participants in the treatment group (i.e., the group shown AI-generated NCII of a political candidate) will be more likely to experience negative emotional states (e.g., anger, vulnerability, shame, anxiety etc.) and less likely to experience positive emotional states (e.g., hope, joy, enthusiasm).

Analogous to the “chilling effect” observed in contexts of surveillance and data regulation – where individuals refrain from exercising their rights due to perceived risks (Perri and Thaw, 2017) – the prospect of deepfake attacks may discourage individuals, particularly from marginalized groups, from entering public life. Research on political violence similarly shows that exposure to violence against female politicians can reduce political ambition and descriptive representation (Bjarnegård et al., 2022; Håkansson, 2024). We extend this logic to AI-generated NCII, which has been conceptualized as a form of gendered violence (Mithani, 2024). Such attacks not only degrade the reputations of targeted individuals, but also function as a form of symbolic violence, signaling the reputational and psychological costs of public visibility. Assuming that individuals seek to minimize their exposure to harm, the threat of being targeted may discourage political ambition and deter potential candidates from running for office, thereby further reinforcing existing patterns of political underrepresentation.

2. Experimental Design

We conducted a pre-registered online experiment in the United States ($n = 1,904$) to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of exposure to AI-generated sexually explicit and

private images on public evaluations of fictitious politicians. Participants were randomly assigned to view either a male or female politician, followed by a second random assignment to exposure conditions featuring sexually explicit images, private images, or neutral (control) images embedded in a realistic social media feed. Figure 1 summarizes the survey design, including randomization procedures and visual examples of the stimuli; further details are provided in the section 5. Our analysis measures the ATE on participants’ affective responses, trustworthiness assessments, perceived competence, leadership prototypicality, and voting intentions, controlling for baseline assessments, sociodemographic characteristics, and ideological alignment. The design further assesses differential ATEs by politician gender, quantifying potential gendered backlash effects against female politicians exposed to deepfake imagery.

3. Results

Our findings show that sexually explicit AI-generated NCII substantially damage public perceptions of political figures, with effects that are consistently negative across evaluations of affect, trust, competence, and leadership. Despite the emotional intensity of these exposures, we find no evidence that viewing deepfakes suppresses political ambition among participants themselves (cf. Figure 2). Surprisingly, male politicians faced stronger backlash than female politicians, contradicting common expectations about gendered vulnerability (cf. Figure 3). These results hold when the effects are estimated on the subset of participants who passed the manipulation check (cf. tables D.15 – D.22). Below, we detail how these patterns unfold across our key outcome variables.

Effect of Explicit Deepfakes on Candidate Evaluations

Exposure to sexually explicit deepfakes significantly reduced affect toward the politician ($\beta = -0.488$, $p < .001$), trustworthiness ($\beta = -0.533$, $p < .001$), perceived competence ($\beta = -0.514$, $p < .001$), and leader prototypicality evaluations ($\beta = -0.636$, $p < .001$), relative to the control group. No significant differences were found between the private and control conditions across any outcome (cf. Table D.7, Figure 2).

Effect on Vote Intentions

Participants in the explicit image condition reported a significantly lower likelihood of voting for the candidate ($\beta = -0.624$, $p < .001$), and believed others would be less likely to do so as well ($\beta = -0.908$, $p < .001$). The private image condition again did not differ from the control (cf. Table D.8, Figure 2).

Effect on Participants’ Political Ambition

While participants shown explicit images reported slightly lower ambition to run for office at the local, state, and federal levels, none of the effects reached statistical significance (all $p > .05$, cf. Table D.9, Figure 2).




Figure 1: **Survey design and experimental flow.** This figure illustrates the sequential structure of the survey experiment, including randomization procedures, key measurement stages, and example stimuli from each condition. After providing demographic information and completing an attention check, participants were randomized to view a fictitious male or female politician. They were then exposed to campaign flyers and completed baseline perception measures. Participants were subsequently randomized into one of three conditions: a control group (viewing only regular images), an explicit deepfake condition (exposing participants to AI-generated NCII), or a private image condition (featuring non-explicit private images). Post-treatment measures assessed candidate evaluations, vote intention, political ambition, and emotional responses, followed by a deepfake recognition task and debriefing.

Emotional Reactions to Deepfakes

We find mixed evidence with regard to participants' affective response to being exposed to explicit or private images of political candidates. Participants in the explicit image condition reported feeling significantly more ashamed ($\beta = 0.192$, $p = .004$), scared ($\beta = 0.133$, $p = .047$), embarrassed ($\beta = 0.159$, $p = .010$), and betrayed ($\beta = 0.132$, $p = .033$). Effects for the remaining negative and positive emotions did not reach statistical significance (all $p > .05$). By contrast, participants in the private image condition consistently reported experiencing fewer negative emotions and greater positive emotions; all effects were statistically significant at $p < .01$ (cf. Table D.10–D.12)

Gendered Backlash

Contrary to our expectations, the negative effects of explicit deepfakes were more pronounced for male candidates. Compared to female politicians, men experienced greater declines in evaluations of affect towards the candidate ($\beta = -0.369$, $p < .001$), perceived competence ($\beta = -0.292$, $p < .001$), trustworthiness ($\beta = -0.305$, $p < .001$), and leader prototypicality ($\beta = -0.363$, $p < .001$). The same reversal appeared in behavioral intention. Male candidates were penalized more heavily in self-reported vote likelihood ($\beta = -0.334$, $p < .001$), though there was no significant gender difference in participants' predictions about others' vote choices ($\beta = -0.142$, $p = .123$). These results suggest a reversed gender effect that penalizes male political candidates more strongly than female candidates (cf. Table D.13, Figure 3).

Private versus Explicit Deepfakes

Across all outcome variables, the sexually explicit condition consistently differed from the control, while the private condition did not. Although not formally hypothesized, we find weak evidence that private images may slightly increase perceived warmth and relatability, although none of these effects passed the $p < .05$ threshold. These results show that explicit deepfakes have a stronger negative impact than private ones, but offer limited evidence that private images exert any systematic impact.

Additional Analyses

In addition, we conducted two post-hoc analyses to further probe into the effects of being exposed to AI-generated NCII of political candidates. First, we explore the effect of the treatment on trust in various social and public institutions (cf. tables D.23, D.24). We find a negative effect of the treatment on trust in elected officials ($\beta = -0.090$, $p = .005$), journalists ($\beta = -0.094$, $p = .002$), and traditional media ($\beta = -0.089$, $p = .002$). These results suggest a spillover effect of exposure to AI-generated NCII on trust in elected officials and media actors.

Second, we explore the extent to which the treatment effect hinges on deepfake recognition – i.e., whether participants thought the NCII were real or identified them as AI-generated. Conducting a subgroup analysis – disaggregating respondents into those who judged the images as real, as false, or who were undecided – we find that individuals who explicitly stated that the images were not real nonetheless ascribed lower affect




Figure 2: **Estimated marginal means and treatment effects across outcome domains.** The figure presents model-adjusted means and 95% confidence intervals for all primary outcomes, comparing participants exposed to explicit AI-generated NCII or private images against a control condition. The upper part of the plot shows adjusted means on the outcome scales, while the lower part depicts the corresponding effect sizes expressed as percentage change relative to the control group. Exposure to explicit deepfakes significantly reduced affective evaluations, trustworthiness, perceived competence, and perceptions of leader prototypicality. Both self-reported and perceived vote intentions also declined in the explicit condition. By contrast, political ambition at the local, state, and federal levels remained largely unaffected by exposure to AI-generated NCII.

($\beta = -0.240$, $p < 0.001$), trust ($\beta = -0.235$, $p < 0.001$), competence ($\beta = -0.309$, $p < 0.001$), and leadership capabilities ($\beta = -0.402$, $p < 0.001$) to political candidates and reported lower voting intentions ($\beta = -0.373$, $p < 0.001$; cf. tables D.25, D.26).

4. Discussion

This project examines the reputational and political consequences of sexually explicit AI-generated deepfakes targeting political figures. Using an online survey experiment with an ideologically balanced U.S. sample, we investigated how exposure to explicit versus private or neutral imagery of political candidates affects public perceptions of their competence, trustworthiness, leadership qualities, and electability. In addition, we examined potential gendered effects by testing whether the reputational impact of deepfakes varies depending on the politician's gender. Finally, we also assessed whether exposure to such imagery shapes individuals' emotional responses and influences their own political ambition.

Our findings demonstrate that AI-generated NCII can cause significant damage to politicians' public perception, harming both their personal and professional appeal. These results are very concerning given their broader implication for democratic processes and public trust. Supporting our expectations regarding the deceptive nature of deepfakes, our study underscores their nature as a potent tool for political sabotage and subsequent dissemination of distorted views among the broader electorate (Dobber et al., 2021; Vaccari and Chadwick, 2020). However, contrary to our expectations and prior literature on gendered scandal penalties, male politicians in our study were punished more strongly than their female counterparts. Prior studies have typically found that women face harsher judgment for perceived moral transgressions (Barnes et al., 2020; Saxton and Barnes, 2022; Žemojtel Piotrowska et al., 2016). Our results, however, suggest that this pattern reverses when the reputational threat stems from synthetic pornography: participants in the explicit condition evaluated the male politician more negatively compared to his female counterpart across all key outcomes (see tables D.7, D.8). This finding is particularly notable given prior evidence that indicates that reputational dam-




Figure 3: **Estimated marginal means and treatment effects by candidate gender.** This figure replicates the structure of Figure 2, but disaggregates results by the gender of the depicted politician. The upper panel displays model-adjusted means with 95% confidence intervals, while the lower panel shows percentage changes relative to the control condition. Connecting arches indicate statistically significant differences in treatment effects between male and female candidates. Contrary to expectations, exposure to explicit AI-generated NCII depicting male politicians led to significantly larger reductions in affective evaluations, perceived trustworthiness, competence, and leader prototypicality evaluations. Similarly, both self-reported and perceived vote intentions were significantly lower for participants exposed to explicit NCII of the male, compared to the female politician.

age from sexual scandals typically affects personal, but not professional, evaluations (Doherty et al., 2011). One plausible explanation lies in the frequent sexualized portrayal of women in everyday life – a pattern reinforced by the pornography industry – which serves to normalize and entrench objectifying attitudes (Bridges et al., 2024; Willis et al., 2022). Such portrayals may render NCII involving women less novel or transgressive than comparable depictions of men. Another possibility relates to public expectations: historically, female politicians’ involvement in scandals is rarer (Williamson, 2016) and may therefore be perceived as isolated incidents. In contrast, recurring scandals involving male politicians (Courtemanche and Connor Green, 2020) could reinforce stereotypes of moral laxity, making misconduct appear more plausible and predictable. Yet, a simple cross-tabulation suggested that participants rate the AI-generated NCII of the male and female candidate as similarly realistic (cf. table C.6.

Voters’ ideological orientations further shape responses to

sexualized portrayals of politicians. Conservative voters typically uphold stringent moral standards and may perceive such intimate depictions as moral transgressions that warrant social sanction (Barnes et al., 2020). Progressive and feminist voters, in contrast, may apply harsher judgments specifically to male politicians, interpreting their involvement in such portrayals as emblematic of patriarchal privilege. Male politicians may thus face steeper penalties following the publication of AI-generated NCII if voters interpret these depictions through the lens of systemic power abuse and exploitation (Doherty et al., 2011). Such perceptions may be further amplified by recent cultural shifts, most notably the #MeToo movement, which has heightened public scrutiny of men in positions of power (Williamson, 2016; Costa et al., 2020). To account for potential ideological biases in our study, we ensured balanced representation of left-leaning, centrist, and right-leaning participants.

Contrary to our expectations, the analyses revealed no significant effects of exposure to AI-generated NCII on partici-

pants' self-reported political ambition. Several factors may account for this null finding. One plausible explanation is that participants exhibited a predominantly affective response to the stimulus, as evidenced by elevated reports of negative emotions such as shame, fear, and embarrassment in the post-treatment models (see Table ??). These emotional responses suggest that participants primarily empathized with the candidate depicted and the public exposure of their privacy within a social media context, rather than engaging in a reflective evaluation of personal risks associated with political engagement. Such immediate emotional reactions may have precluded the deeper cognitive processing required for participants to extrapolate from the candidate's experience to their own prospective political engagement. A second and likely more consequential explanation lies in the low baseline levels of political ambition observed in our sample, with mean ambition scores of 2.31 for local, 2.10 for state, and 1.95 for federal office (scales from 1 to 5, see table C.5). This restricted range limits the capacity to detect treatment-induced reductions in ambition, as already low intentions to pursue office offer little room for further decline.

Nonetheless, the absence of a direct effect in our study should not be taken to diminish the broader implications of AI-generated NCII for political representation. Extant cases of deepfake attacks illustrate that public visibility can entail reputational risks that are difficult to pre-empt or control. The mere prospect of such symbolic violence – and the associated psychological and reputational costs – may thus function as a deterrent in more insidious, long-term ways, further reinforcing extant patterns of descriptive representation (Bjarnegård et al., 2022; Håkansson, 2024). Future research would therefore benefit from longitudinal designs capable of capturing these more gradual and potentially compounding effects on political ambition and participation.

Practically, the proliferation of non-consensual sexual deepfakes presents pressing ethical and legal challenges. Technological advances embodied in applications such as Reface, DeepFaceLab, and the more infamous DeepNude¹ have democratized capabilities that were once confined to specialists in the entertainment industry – the creation of hyper-realistic, fabricated videos that depict individuals engaging in acts or uttering statements they never performed. While some technical expertise remains necessary, the increasing sophistication and user-friendliness of these tools have significantly lowered the barriers to entry, expanding the potential for widespread misuse (Burkell and Gosse, 2019). In connection to the broader risks posed by AI-generated NCII to democratic processes, the integration of deepfake technologies with social media has further amplified their weaponization: what was once a reputational threat reserved for public figures can now be directed at virtually anyone whose likeness exists online (Gosse and Burkell, 2020).

These risks underscore the need for advancing robust detec-

¹Targeted exclusively at female subjects, the app DeepNude was based on an algorithm that can digitally undress women in photos. It was taken down shortly after its publication by its owners, stating that the world was not yet ready for their technology (Telford, 2019).

tion technologies, strengthening legal frameworks to address AI-generated NCII, and enhancing platform accountability. In response to the growing prevalence of such cases, policymakers and technology companies have begun taking action. In May 2025, the U.S. Congress passed the bipartisan “Take It Down Act”, which criminalizes the distribution of AI-generated NCII and mandates that platforms remove such content within 48 hours of notice (Staff, 2025). Similar legislation is advancing on the state level in the US (Edelman, 2024). Meanwhile, tech companies such as Meta have begun suing developers of nudification apps, such as the Chinese platform “CrushAI” in an effort to curtail the spread of synthetic abuse tools (Fung, 2025). Equally important is the development of effective correction strategies, such as prebunking, debunking, or the use of watermarks, to mitigate the negative effects identified. To this end, a follow-up study is planned to examine the efficacy of these mitigation approaches. Without corrective, legal, and policy interventions, the continued spread of deepfake attacks may not only distort evaluations of targeted candidates but also spill over into broader political attitudes, potentially fostering cynicism, dampening voter engagement, and eroding confidence in democratic institutions (Hoes et al., 2025), including elected officials and media actors (cf. tables D.23, D.24). Such spillovers are consistent with theories of belief echoes (Thorson, 2016, 2024) and priming (Van Duyn and Collier, 2019), in which exposure to persuasive but false information – even when recognized as fabricated – can leave enduring negative impressions that generalize beyond the original target.

Beyond legal and technical interventions, our findings bear important implications for education. Even among participants who doubted the authenticity of the deepfakes, evaluative judgments remained significantly and negatively affected. This reinforces the notion that the harm of deepfakes does not stem solely from failures of recognition – indeed, detection rates remain close to chance (Diel et al., 2024) – but in fact from the underlying cognitive mechanisms that render visual fabrications so persuasive. Human perception is evolutionarily wired to trust what is seen, and memory-formation processes make it difficult to fully “unsee” or disregard emotionally salient imagery once encountered (Newman et al., 2022; Murphy and Flynn, 2022). A post-hoc subgroup analysis of our experiment supports this point (tables D.25, D.26). For this reason, educational interventions must move beyond simple awareness-raising to explicitly target these cognitive vulnerabilities. Programs that incorporate psychological inoculation techniques, critical media literacy, and mindset-shifting approaches (c.f. Van Der Linden and Roozenbeek, 2024) – fostering a habitual awareness that “seeing” may not equal “believing” – may help mitigate the illusory truth effect and build psychological resilience against synthetic media manipulation.

Several limitations of this study warrant consideration. Most notably, the use of a fictitious politician limits the generalizability of our findings to real-world contexts, where public evaluations are shaped by entrenched beliefs, partisan affiliations, and prevailing media narratives. To avoid any ethical concerns or reputational harm to real individuals, we created deepfake stimuli depicting a fictional parliamentary candidate, “Sam Taylor,”

running for office in Derby South. We deliberately situated the candidate in a UK context to ensure sufficient distance from US participants' own political landscape while maintaining plausibility, as campaign materials presented in English are natural in this setting. Secondly, we acknowledge that reputational dynamics in experimental settings – particularly when involving unfamiliar, fictitious politicians – may not fully capture the complexities of real-world political evaluations. In practice, perceptions of scandal or misconduct are likely to unfold differently when they involve well-known public figures embedded within broader political and media ecosystems. Still, responses in our pretest (see table E.32) as well as the control condition indicate that participants engaged positively with the fictional candidate, suggesting that our approach successfully established a baseline reputation. Third, our stimuli relied on static images rather than video deepfakes, which may underestimate the potential impact of more immersive and dynamic synthetic media. Existing research indicates that videographic deepfakes – synthetic videos generated through advanced AI – tend to be more impactful than photographic deepfakes, largely due to their enhanced realism and the persuasive power of moving images (Vaccari and Chadwick, 2020; Fallis, 2021). Unlike static photographs, videos can depict individuals speaking and behaving in fabricated yet convincing ways, making them particularly effective in shaping perceptions and conveying false narratives in political and social contexts. That said, the magnitude of the effects observed in our explicit condition suggests that the static deepfake images we created were nonetheless sufficiently credible to influence participants' evaluations.

Collectively, our findings indicate that sexually explicit, AI-generated NCII can substantially diminish perceptions of competence, leadership, and electability among targeted individuals – even when viewers doubt its authenticity. By undermining reputations and distorting electoral perceptions, such fabrications threaten not only individual dignity but also the integrity of elections and democratic institutions (Pérez Dasilva et al., 2021; Gosse and Burkell, 2020). Our study highlights the need for countermeasures that extend beyond detection to mitigate the enduring psychological impact of fabricated imagery.

5. Methods

The pre-registrations, relevant materials, R scripts, and data are publicly available on OSF for replication purposes.

5.1. Ethics

This research project complied with all ethical regulations for research involving human subjects and received ethical approval from the University of St. Gallen and the University of Zurich Ethics Committee (ethics approval nr. 20241002 and 250506, respectively). Participants provided informed consent at the beginning of the survey and were debriefed at the end (materials available on OSF). Eligibility was restricted to participants aged 21 and above who, via Prolific's existing screening system, had provided prior consent to participate in studies involving explicit content. Additionally, a content-warning label was attached to the study listing to ensure informed participation.

5.2. Participants

In 2025, between May 16 and May 17, we recruited 1904 U.S. participants via Prolific Academic (955 women, 21 diverse, median age group: 25-34, 66.8% white, 63.8% had a bachelor degree or more). The sample was balanced on ideology (1/3 Republican; 1/3 Democrat; 1/3 Independent). The median time it took to complete the survey was 15 minutes.

5.3. Independent Variables

After providing informed consent, participants answered demographic questions (gender, age, education, race, ideology) and reported on their sexual orientation, level of political interest and porn consumption, as well as attitudes towards pornography. All these variables are included as controls in the statistical analyses. Finally, participants completed an attention check, which 11 participants failed. Porn consumption was assessed using the Pornography Usage Measure (PUM) by (Busby et al., 2020), while our measure for attitudes towards pornography was adapted from Grubbs et al. (2015).

5.4. Treatment and Randomization

We drew on a between-subject repeated-measures design in which respondents were randomly assigned to one of six conditions. Our repeated-measures design allowed us to capture baseline evaluations after realistic exposure to campaign materials and assess how these perceptions shifted following exposure to damaging content (AI-generated NCII), enhancing statistical precision in line with best practices (Clifford et al., 2021). While we mitigated common critiques such as consistency bias and anchoring through participant reminders and randomized outcome order (Nickerson, 1998; Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1988; Cialdini et al., 1995), potential drawbacks such as demand characteristics remain and should be considered when interpreting our findings.

The design varied both the gender of the politician (male or female) and the type of visual content shown alongside a campaign flyer. Participants either saw no additional imagery

(control), pornographic images (treatment), or private but non-pornographic images (treatment). This resulted in six groups: C1 and C2 for the control condition (male and female politician, respectively), T1 and T2 for the pornographic image condition, and T3 and T4 for the private image condition. This design allowed us to test both the main and interactive effects of image type and politician gender. Figure 1 provides an overview of the survey flow, including the randomization procedures and visual examples of the stimuli used. All steps are described in detail below.

In the first randomization step, participants were assigned to either the male or female politician condition. They then proceeded to read a profile of the assigned fictional politician, Sam Taylor – a gender-neutral name selected to minimize gendered name effects between conditions. The profile introduced Sam Taylor as a parliamentary candidate for Derby South, a UK constituency chosen to enhance the credibility of the profile while remaining unfamiliar to U.S.-based respondents, thereby reducing the likelihood of prior associations that could bias responses.

The profile, presented in the format of a campaign pamphlet, provided background information on the candidate’s upbringing, professional trajectory, and policy positions. To enhance realism and provide a comprehensive impression of the candidate, the pamphlet featured six AI-generated images of Sam Taylor depicted in typical political contexts: a professional headshot, attending a community event, participating in a campaign event, delivering a speech, engaging in a discussion, and working in an office setting.

To guarantee adequate exposure, participants’ viewing times were monitored, with minimum thresholds enforced: 15 seconds for shorter pages and 25 seconds for longer ones. This ensured that all participants had sufficient time to form an initial impression of the candidate. To control for potential false recognition, participants were asked whether they recognized the politician from the news, media, or other sources; (78%) indicated that the politician was unfamiliar. Immediately following the profile reading, participants completed the initial evaluations of the candidate, which constituted the main outcomes of interest.

In the second randomization step, participants were assigned to either the control group or one of two treatment groups. All participants first read the following introductory statement: “You will now be redirected to a social media feed featuring posts about current events, both globally and in South Derby. Some posts include recently circulated images of Sam Taylor, the politician you have just learned about.” Participants in the control group viewed a mock social media feed containing two standard images of Sam Taylor (images 5 and 6), posted by fictitious local news accounts. Participants in the treatment groups followed the same procedure but were additionally exposed to either two explicit images (explicit images 1 and 2, posted by anonymous users) or two private images (private images 1 and 2, posted by a fictitious gossip account). The mock social media feed was custom-programmed in JavaScript and hosted on GitHub Pages. For all conditions, participants’ time spent on the feed was recorded, and a minimum viewing time of 60 sec-

onds was enforced to ensure adequate exposure.

5.5. Creation and Selection of Visual Survey Materials

The selection and adaptation of the pamphlet and all images were informed by two pre-tests, the rationale, procedures, and results of which are described in detail in the pre-registration on OSF. In the first pre-test (N = 300), we evaluated whether the AI-generated images were perceived as realistic and depicting the same individual across contexts. This was essential to ensure the ecological validity of our manipulations, as any perceived inconsistency or artificiality could undermine the credibility of the fictional politician and compromise internal validity. A follow-up pre-test (N = 57) was conducted to improve the realism of explicit images for male politicians. The second main pre-test (N = 60) confirmed that the fictional candidate, Sam Taylor, was perceived as politically centrist to slightly left-leaning. This ideological positioning was intentional: recent NCII cases have disproportionately targeted progressive or liberal politicians, and we aimed to design a profile that reflects this real-world pattern while remaining broadly relatable across the political spectrum. The images were generated using OpenArt, an online platform that provides access to a large repository of tools for creating custom visual content using generative models.

5.6. Outcome Variables

Participants reported on their *affect* for the depicted politician (e.g., “I like Sam Taylor as a leader,” from ‘strongly disagree’ [1] to ‘strongly agree’ [5]), *trustworthiness* (“Sam Taylor is easily trusted”), perceived *competence* (“Sam Taylor is competent as a leader”), and *leader prototypicality*, (four items, e.g. “Sam Taylor acts like a typical leader”) adapted from Cronshaw and Lord (1987). They also indicated their *intention to vote* (“If you were allowed to vote in the upcoming UK national election, how likely were you to vote for Sam Taylor?”), and perceived *electability* (“How likely are others to vote for Sam Taylor in an upcoming UK national election?”; both from ‘very unlikely’ [1] to ‘very likely’ [5]). Additional items measured *trust in institutions* (e.g., “How much do you trust journalists?” from ‘not at all’ [1] to ‘strongly’ [5]) and *political ambition* (“Would you ever consider running for office at the [LEVEL]?”). As pre-registered, these outcomes were measured twice: once after participants read the profile and again after exposure to the treatment.

Following the treatment, participants in the experimental groups first completed a manipulation check before continuing to the main outcome measures (15.32% failed the manipulation check). In addition, to assess potential *false recognition* and how participants interpreted the authenticity and ideological positioning of the materials, we included three further follow-up items – each measured only once, post-treatment. First, participants indicated whether they recognized any of the individuals in the timeline as the politician shown in the pamphlet (82.8% indicated they did), which allows us to control for recognition effects. Second, participants were asked whether they believed the images of Sam Taylor were real (17.3% said yes, 43.4%

were unsure, 33.5% said no, 5.8% chose “other”), enabling us to assess whether (mis)recognition of deepfakes influenced evaluations of credibility, competence, and electability. Third, they rated the perceived ideology of the politician on a scale from 1 (very liberal) to 5 (very conservative) (mean = 2.07, providing insight into how the candidate was positioned ideologically.

To explore how individuals respond emotionally to the treatments, we included an additional set of items measured only once, after treatment. We deliberately placed these items at the end of the survey to avoid priming participants or revealing the study’s purpose too early. These items were designed to assess participants’ own feelings of vulnerability and emotional distress when imagining themselves in the situation depicted. Finally, all participants were redirected to a full debriefing.

5.7. Statistical analyses

Following the pre-registration, we used the statistical software R to analyze our data. For each hypothesis, we ran an OLS regression with our post-treatment outcomes measure as the dependent variable, treatment as the independent variable, and control for sociodemographics, the two recognition items, and baseline perceptions as measured pre-treatment, except for the two outcomes related to emotions. We additionally control for the distance between participants’ self-reported ideology and participants’ perceived ideology of the fictitious politician. While we exclude participants who failed the attention check, we do not exclude participants failing the manipulation check in the main analysis, yet remove them in additional analyses as a robustness test.

Conflict of interest

Acknowledgements

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Appendix A. Creation of Treatment Materials

Note to reviewers: All treatment materials have been made available as “review only” to allow reusability in follow-up studies and prevent the proliferation of sexually explicit content.

The treatment images used in this study were generated through a multi-step process using the online AI-based image generation platform OpenArt as well as the face-swapping tool PIXLR. The first and second authors created fictitious professional headshots of four politicians (two male, two female), which served as the foundational profiles for all experimental conditions. These portraits were iteratively refined to introduce variation in facial features, hair color and length, and eye color, while ensuring high visual realism. Common AI-generated artifacts (e.g., anatomical inaccuracies, gaze irregularities) were systematically corrected.

These headshots were then used to create scenario-specific images depicting the candidates in professional and private settings (e.g., delivering speeches, engaging with the community, or at the beach). A digital reference catalog of real-world images of public figures with similar physical features was compiled to guide this process. Using these reference images, we employed the online tool PIXLR to face-swap our fictitious candidate portraits into the scenarios. Each resulting image was iteratively optimized for realism and consistency.

For the explicit treatment condition, the first author curated suitable base material from widely accessed adult-content websites, following the same systematic catalog approach. Explicit images were generated by combining these materials with the AI-generated portraits, using PIXLR for facial integration and OpenArt for image editing to ensure visual realism.

All image sets were pretested on Prolific (N = 298; see tables ?? – ??) to evaluate perceived realism and the ideological positioning of the depicted candidates. Results indicated that the image set for *Female 2* was rated as more realistic than the alternative, leading to its selection for the main study. For the male candidates, the first pretest identified the image set for *male 2* as more realistic, however all initial explicit images were rated lower in realism than in the female condition. Therefore, we created six additional images (three per male candidate) based on new materials. A follow-up pretest with an academic sample (N = 57) identified image 3 for *Male 2* as sufficiently realistic and closer to the explicit image for the female condition (cf. table ??). As the realism ratings for the full image set were higher for male 2, we proceeded with this profile.

We subsequently designed campaign flyers for both candidates, presenting a balanced policy platform combining traditionally liberal (e.g., housing affordability) and conservative (e.g., support for small businesses) issues to position the candidate as centrist. The candidate was named ‘Sam Taylor’, a common gender-neutral name in the UK, with the spouse named ‘Alex’. Participants were informed whether Sam Taylor had a wife or a husband; heterosexual pairings were used in both gender conditions to reflect the most likely scenario and minimize potential participant distraction.

The flyer was pretested on Prolific (N = 60; see Table ??), where participants perceived the candidate as left-leaning. The flyer content was subsequently revised to present a more center-left stance. In the main study, participants confirmed that Sam Taylor was perceived as moderately, or slightly, left-leaning.

Appendix B. Observational Analysis of Instagram and Reddit Comments

In our pre-registration, we planned an observational analysis of Instagram and Reddit comments directed at two UK politicians – Cara Hunter and Angela Rayner. These politicians were selected due to their direct experience with AI-generated, sexually explicit deepfake imagery. Cara Hunter was targeted in April 2022, shortly before the Northern Irish legislative elections, while Angela Rayner was targeted in July 2024, close to the UK elections.

We collected data from Instagram posts made by these politicians and Reddit comments from posts generated through specific query searches around the events (NAME POLITICIAN AND (politics OR policy OR politician OR government OR election OR MP OR MLA OR minister OR party OR UK OR Ireland OR “Northern Ireland” OR “Great Britain”). Data collection spanned two distinct periods: for Angela Rayner, from June 15 to July 31, 2024 (with the deepfake event on July 1 and election on July 4); and for Cara Hunter, from April 1 to May 30, 2022 (with the deepfake event on April 15 and election on May 5).

Comments were analyzed using pre-trained classifiers for negative sentiment and toxicity (Antypas and Camacho-Collados, 2023; Hanu and Unitary team, 2020). On Instagram, we analyzed 80 posts by Cara Hunter (484 total comments) and 30 posts by Angela Rayner (5935 total comments). On Reddit, the dataset was smaller, with 2 posts (5 comments) related to Cara Hunter and 47 posts (3236 comments) related to Angela Rayner.

Initial findings indicated a presence of negative and toxic comments; however, these comments were predominantly unrelated to the deepfake incidents. Instead, spikes in negativity correlated primarily with the electoral periods in which both politicians were involved. Due to the limited amount and specificity of data, we could not complete the pre-registered Interrupted Time Series and Synthetic Control Method analyses. Nonetheless, we provide figures illustrating the temporal distribution and frequency of toxic comments as an overview for transparency and completeness.




Figure B.4: Comments to Instagram posts by Angela Rayner.

Toxic Comments Over Time for Cara Hunter
Data source: Instagram comments




Figure B.5: Comments to Instagram posts by Cara Hunter.

Toxic Comments Over Time for Politicians similar to Angela Rayner
Data source: Reddit posts and comments




Figure B.6: Comments to Reddit posts referencing Angela Rayner.

Toxic Comments Over Time for Politicians similar to Cara Hunter
Data source: Reddit posts and comments




Figure B.7: Comments to Reddit posts referencing Cara Hunter.

Appendix C. Descriptive Statistics

Table C.1: Frequencies of treatment conditions by candidate gender

| Condition | Male | Female | Total |
|--------------------------|------|--------|-------|
| Control Condition | 307 | 305 | 612 |
| Explicit Image Condition | 308 | 307 | 615 |
| Private Image Condition | 306 | 306 | 612 |
| Total | 921 | 918 | 1839 |

Table C.2: Frequencies of treatment conditions by candidate gender (Attention Check Passed)

| Condition | Male | Female | Total |
|--------------------------|------|--------|-------|
| Control Condition | 307 | 305 | 612 |
| Explicit Image Condition | 305 | 304 | 609 |
| Private Image Condition | 303 | 305 | 608 |
| Total | 915 | 914 | 1829 |

Table C.3: Single statistics of attention and manipulation checks

| Statistic | Total | Percentage |
|--|-------|------------|
| Participants who passed attention check | 1829 | 99.46% |
| Participants who passed manipulation check | 1039 | 84.68% |

Table C.4: Descriptive statistics of all outcome variables

| Variable | Mean | Median | Mode | SD | Min | Max |
|--|------|--------|------|------|-----|-----|
| Affect Leader (pre) | 4.15 | 4.00 | 4 | 0.77 | 1 | 5 |
| Trust Leader (pre) | 3.90 | 4.00 | 4 | 0.84 | 1 | 5 |
| Competence Leader (pre) | 4.14 | 4.00 | 4 | 0.73 | 1 | 5 |
| Leader Prototypicality (pre) | 4.14 | 4.25 | 4 | 0.65 | 1 | 5 |
| Intent Vote (self) (pre) | 4.17 | 4.00 | 5 | 0.92 | 1 | 5 |
| Intent Vote (others) (pre) | 4.13 | 4.00 | 4 | 0.81 | 1 | 5 |
| Own Political Ambitions (local) (pre) | 2.31 | 2.00 | 1 | 1.38 | 1 | 5 |
| Own Political Ambitions (state) (pre) | 2.10 | 2.00 | 1 | 1.35 | 1 | 5 |
| Own Political Ambitions (federal) (pre) | 1.95 | 1.00 | 1 | 1.30 | 1 | 5 |
| Affect Leader (post) | 3.93 | 4.00 | 4 | 0.92 | 1 | 5 |
| Trust Leader (post) | 3.72 | 4.00 | 4 | 0.95 | 1 | 5 |
| Competence Leader (post) | 3.93 | 4.00 | 4 | 0.90 | 1 | 5 |
| Leader Prototypicality (post) | 3.87 | 4.00 | 4 | 0.87 | 1 | 5 |
| Intent Vote (self) (post) | 3.90 | 4.00 | 5 | 1.12 | 1 | 5 |
| Intent Vote (others) (post) | 3.81 | 4.00 | 4 | 1.03 | 1 | 5 |
| Own Political Ambitions (local) (post) | 2.25 | 2.00 | 1 | 1.39 | 1 | 5 |
| Own Political Ambitions (state) (post) | 2.06 | 1.00 | 1 | 1.34 | 1 | 5 |
| Own Political Ambitions (federal) (post) | 1.97 | 1.00 | 1 | 1.33 | 1 | 5 |
| Vulnerable | 4.31 | 5.00 | 5 | 0.94 | 1 | 5 |
| Ashamed | 3.88 | 4.00 | 5 | 1.21 | 1 | 6 |
| Anxious | 4.15 | 4.00 | 5 | 1.02 | 1 | 5 |
| Scared | 3.70 | 4.00 | 4 | 1.22 | 1 | 6 |
| Embarrassed | 4.18 | 5.00 | 5 | 1.12 | 1 | 5 |
| Angry | 4.32 | 5.00 | 5 | 1.00 | 1 | 5 |
| Betrayed | 4.16 | 5.00 | 5 | 1.11 | 1 | 5 |
| Powerless | 3.76 | 4.00 | 5 | 1.24 | 1 | 5 |
| Enthusiastic | 1.84 | 2.00 | 1 | 1.05 | 1 | 5 |
| Excited | 1.66 | 1.00 | 1 | 0.99 | 1 | 5 |

Table C.5: Descriptive statistics of covariates

| Variable | Mean | Median | Mode | SD | Min | Max |
|------------------------|------|--------|------|------|-----|-----|
| Gender | NA | NA | 2 | NA | 1 | 3 |
| Age | 3.31 | 3 | 2 | 1.35 | 1 | 6 |
| Education | 5.67 | 6 | 6 | 1.20 | 1 | 7 |
| Race | NA | NA | 6 | NA | 1 | 7 |
| Sexual Orientation | NA | NA | 1 | NA | 1 | 5 |
| Politician Familiarity | NA | NA | 2 | NA | 1 | 3 |
| Recognition Politician | NA | NA | 1 | NA | 1 | 3 |
| Recognition Deepfake | NA | NA | 3 | NA | 1 | 3 |
| Ideological Difference | 0.95 | 1 | 0 | 0.97 | 0 | 4 |
| Ideology | 2.92 | 3 | 3 | 1.31 | 1 | 5 |
| Perceived Ideology | 2.56 | 2 | 2 | 1.16 | 1 | 5 |

Table C.6: Cross-tabulation of candidate gender with recognition of deepfake

| | No | Yes | Not sure |
|--------|-------|-------|----------|
| Female | 36.14 | 17.85 | 46.01 |
| Male | 34.93 | 18.86 | 46.21 |

Appendix D. Regression Models

Appendix D.1. Preregistered Models

Appendix D.1.1. Main Effects

Table D.7: Pre-Post Models Summary for Leadership

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Affect Leader (1) | Trust Leader (2) | Competence Leader (3) | Leader Prototypicality (4) |
| Condition: Explicit | -0.488*** (0.043) | -0.533*** (0.042) | -0.514*** (0.042) | -0.636*** (0.037) |
| Condition: Private | 0.003 (0.042) | 0.053 (0.041) | 0.016 (0.042) | -0.052 (0.037) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | -0.070* (0.035) | -0.106** (0.034) | -0.083* (0.034) | -0.077* (0.030) |
| Participant Gender: Female | 0.001 (0.035) | 0.010 (0.034) | -0.003 (0.035) | -0.052 (0.031) |
| Participant Gender: Other | -0.122 (0.181) | -0.020 (0.177) | 0.134 (0.176) | -0.051 (0.155) |
| Age | 0.029* (0.013) | -0.002 (0.013) | -0.001 (0.013) | 0.015 (0.012) |
| Education | 0.012 (0.015) | 0.017 (0.014) | 0.018 (0.015) | 0.010 (0.013) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | -0.156 (0.404) | -0.209 (0.394) | -0.093 (0.402) | -0.348 (0.353) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | -0.104 (0.190) | -0.195 (0.185) | -0.091 (0.188) | -0.288 (0.166) |
| Race: Black/African American | -0.018 (0.175) | -0.121 (0.170) | -0.033 (0.173) | -0.179 (0.153) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | -0.015 (0.185) | -0.108 (0.181) | 0.069 (0.184) | -0.098 (0.162) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | -0.036 (0.171) | -0.109 (0.166) | -0.028 (0.170) | -0.202 (0.149) |
| Race: Other | -0.189 (0.193) | -0.027 (0.189) | 0.005 (0.193) | -0.292 (0.169) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | 0.038 (0.083) | 0.012 (0.082) | -0.073 (0.082) | 0.003 (0.072) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.036 (0.059) | 0.084 (0.058) | 0.030 (0.059) | 0.067 (0.052) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | -0.064 (0.177) | 0.032 (0.172) | -0.160 (0.175) | 0.117 (0.154) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | -0.035 (0.163) | 0.069 (0.159) | -0.140 (0.160) | 0.052 (0.141) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.074 (0.048) | -0.058 (0.047) | -0.030 (0.048) | -0.006 (0.042) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | -0.142 (0.084) | -0.073 (0.082) | -0.104 (0.083) | -0.123 (0.073) |
| Recognition Politician: No | 0.056 (0.053) | 0.058 (0.051) | -0.003 (0.053) | 0.032 (0.046) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | 0.166* (0.085) | 0.151 (0.083) | 0.059 (0.084) | 0.145 (0.074) |
| Ideology Difference | -0.027 (0.019) | -0.059** (0.018) | -0.039* (0.019) | -0.023 (0.017) |
| Perceived Ideology | -0.002 (0.016) | -0.007 (0.015) | -0.029 (0.016) | -0.006 (0.014) |
| Affect Leader (pre) | 0.652*** (0.024) | | | |
| Trust Leader (pre) | | 0.681*** (0.021) | | |
| Competence Leader (pre) | | | 0.654*** (0.024) | |
| Leader Prototypicality (pre) | | | | 0.776*** (0.024) |
| Constant | 1.375*** (0.233) | 1.395*** (0.219) | 1.494*** (0.232) | 1.071*** (0.210) |
| Observations | 1,817 | 1,814 | 1,815 | 1,818 |
| R ² | 0.373 | 0.443 | 0.355 | 0.456 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.364 | 0.435 | 0.346 | 0.449 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.732 (df = 1792) | 0.714 (df = 1789) | 0.728 (df = 1790) | 0.641 (df = 1793) |
| F Statistic | 44.370*** (df = 24; 1792) | 59.225*** (df = 24; 1789) | 41.001*** (df = 24; 1790) | 62.707*** (df = 24; 1793) |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table D.8: Pre-Post Models Summary for Vote Intentions

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | Intent Vote (self) (1) | Intent Vote (others) (2) |
| Condition: Explicit | -0.624*** (0.046) | -0.908*** (0.046) |
| Condition: Private | 0.051 (0.046) | -0.024 (0.046) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | -0.092* (0.037) | -0.028 (0.037) |
| Participant Gender: Female | -0.050 (0.038) | -0.062 (0.038) |
| Participant Gender: Other | 0.008 (0.191) | -0.141 (0.192) |
| Age | 0.015 (0.015) | 0.035* (0.015) |
| Education | -0.007 (0.016) | 0.004 (0.016) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | -0.026 (0.436) | 0.232 (0.438) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | -0.252 (0.205) | -0.294 (0.205) |
| Race: Black/African American | -0.123 (0.188) | -0.116 (0.189) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | -0.017 (0.200) | -0.153 (0.201) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | -0.186 (0.184) | -0.228 (0.185) |
| Race: Other | -0.048 (0.209) | -0.194 (0.210) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | -0.051 (0.090) | 0.050 (0.090) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.108 (0.065) | 0.024 (0.064) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | 0.274 (0.190) | 0.277 (0.191) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | 0.079 (0.178) | 0.010 (0.174) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.023 (0.053) | -0.122* (0.053) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | -0.222* (0.091) | -0.265** (0.091) |
| Recognition Politician: No | 0.071 (0.057) | 0.127* (0.057) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | 0.181 (0.093) | 0.113 (0.092) |
| Ideology Difference | -0.033 (0.021) | -0.024 (0.020) |
| Perceived Ideology | -0.006 (0.017) | 0.015 (0.017) |
| Intent Vote (self) (pre) | 0.792*** (0.022) | |
| Intent Vote (others) (pre) | | 0.623*** (0.024) |
| Constant | 1.070*** (0.246) | 1.728*** (0.251) |
| Observations | 1,797 | 1,809 |
| R ² | 0.510 | 0.418 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.503 | 0.410 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.790 (df = 1772) | 0.793 (df = 1784) |
| F Statistic | 76.748*** (df = 24; 1772) | 53.315*** (df = 24; 1784) |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table D.9: Pre-Post Models Summary for Political Ambitions

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | |
|---|--|--|--|
| | Own Political Ambitions (local) (1) | Own Political Ambitions (state) (2) | Own Political Ambitions (federal) (3) |
| Condition: Explicit | -0.058 (0.036) | -0.033 (0.031) | -0.064 (0.033) |
| Condition: Private | 0.013 (0.036) | -0.006 (0.030) | -0.057 (0.032) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | 0.044 (0.030) | -0.001 (0.025) | 0.011 (0.026) |
| Participant Gender: Female | -0.083** (0.030) | -0.068** (0.026) | -0.093*** (0.027) |
| Participant Gender: Other | 0.039 (0.151) | -0.125 (0.127) | -0.182 (0.135) |
| Age | -0.016 (0.012) | -0.009 (0.010) | -0.009 (0.010) |
| Education | 0.032* (0.013) | 0.031** (0.011) | 0.035** (0.011) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | -0.310 (0.345) | -0.322 (0.330) | 0.249 (0.309) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | -0.435** (0.162) | -0.425** (0.140) | -0.263 (0.145) |
| Race: Black/African American | -0.352* (0.149) | -0.340** (0.129) | -0.205 (0.133) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | -0.457** (0.159) | -0.361** (0.137) | -0.207 (0.142) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | -0.380** (0.146) | -0.343** (0.127) | -0.201 (0.131) |
| Race: Other | -0.242 (0.166) | -0.276 (0.143) | -0.127 (0.149) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | 0.020 (0.071) | 0.096 (0.060) | 0.065 (0.063) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.049 (0.051) | 0.053 (0.043) | 0.068 (0.046) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | 0.079 (0.151) | 0.162 (0.127) | 0.076 (0.135) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | -0.108 (0.137) | 0.138 (0.116) | 0.080 (0.123) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.133** (0.042) | -0.139*** (0.036) | -0.168*** (0.038) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | -0.013 (0.072) | -0.022 (0.061) | -0.096 (0.065) |
| Recognition Politician: No | 0.034 (0.046) | -0.069 (0.038) | 0.029 (0.041) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | 0.038 (0.072) | -0.002 (0.061) | 0.017 (0.065) |
| Ideology Difference | 0.012 (0.016) | -0.009 (0.013) | -0.007 (0.014) |
| Perceived Ideology | 0.025 (0.013) | 0.037** (0.011) | 0.026* (0.012) |
| Own Political Ambitions (local) (pre) | 0.872*** (0.012) | | |
| Own Political Ambitions (state) (pre) | | 0.886*** (0.010) | |
| Own Political Ambitions (federal) (pre) | | | 0.894*** (0.011) |
| Constant | 0.537** (0.182) | 0.464** (0.156) | 0.398* (0.163) |
| Observations | 1,810 | 1,806 | 1,809 |
| R ² | 0.801 | 0.847 | 0.825 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.799 | 0.845 | 0.823 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.625 (df = 1785) | 0.527 (df = 1781) | 0.559 (df = 1784) |
| F Statistic | 299.768*** (df = 24; 1785) | 410.527*** (df = 24; 1781) | 351.331*** (df = 24; 1784) |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table D.10: Post Models Summary for Negative Emotions

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| | Vulnerable (1) | Ashamed (2) | Anxious (3) | Scared (4) |
| Condition: Explicit | 0.047 (0.053) | 0.192** (0.066) | 0.033 (0.058) | 0.133* (0.067) |
| Condition: Private | -0.370*** (0.052) | -0.606*** (0.066) | -0.405*** (0.057) | -0.560*** (0.066) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | 0.063 (0.043) | 0.168** (0.054) | 0.057 (0.047) | 0.050 (0.054) |
| Participant Gender: Female | 0.240*** (0.044) | 0.270*** (0.055) | 0.265*** (0.048) | 0.422*** (0.055) |
| Participant Gender: Other | 0.324 (0.218) | -0.120 (0.274) | 0.112 (0.239) | 0.456 (0.275) |
| Age | -0.046** (0.017) | -0.123*** (0.021) | -0.059** (0.018) | -0.142*** (0.021) |
| Education | -0.006 (0.018) | 0.022 (0.023) | -0.032 (0.020) | 0.019 (0.023) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | 0.720 (0.498) | -0.090 (0.626) | -0.041 (0.545) | 0.375 (0.628) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | 0.774*** (0.233) | 0.375 (0.294) | 0.341 (0.256) | 0.305 (0.295) |
| Race: Black/African American | 0.626** (0.215) | 0.587* (0.271) | 0.226 (0.236) | 0.355 (0.271) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | 0.613** (0.229) | 0.445 (0.287) | 0.245 (0.250) | 0.108 (0.288) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | 0.702*** (0.210) | 0.461 (0.264) | 0.287 (0.230) | 0.298 (0.265) |
| Race: Other | 0.827*** (0.239) | 0.425 (0.300) | 0.240 (0.262) | 0.289 (0.301) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | 0.115 (0.103) | -0.006 (0.130) | 0.019 (0.113) | -0.027 (0.131) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.019 (0.074) | -0.127 (0.092) | -0.004 (0.080) | 0.163 (0.093) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | -0.409 (0.217) | -0.202 (0.273) | -0.259 (0.238) | -0.247 (0.274) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | -0.525** (0.198) | -0.923*** (0.249) | -0.260 (0.217) | -0.529* (0.250) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | 0.101 (0.060) | -0.204** (0.075) | 0.180** (0.066) | -0.194* (0.076) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | 0.085 (0.104) | 0.025 (0.131) | -0.024 (0.114) | -0.082 (0.132) |
| Recognition Politician: No | -0.119 (0.066) | 0.075 (0.083) | -0.152* (0.072) | 0.078 (0.083) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | -0.030 (0.105) | -0.089 (0.132) | -0.084 (0.115) | -0.008 (0.132) |
| Ideology Difference | 0.010 (0.023) | 0.029 (0.029) | -0.030 (0.025) | 0.003 (0.029) |
| Perceived Ideology | -0.010 (0.019) | 0.011 (0.024) | -0.057** (0.021) | -0.048 (0.024) |
| Constant | 3.722*** (0.260) | 3.737*** (0.327) | 4.283*** (0.285) | 3.930*** (0.328) |
| Observations | 1,787 | 1,789 | 1,791 | 1,787 |
| R ² | 0.080 | 0.138 | 0.081 | 0.138 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.068 | 0.127 | 0.069 | 0.127 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.902 (df = 1763) | 1.134 (df = 1765) | 0.988 (df = 1767) | 1.138 (df = 1763) |
| F Statistic | 6.623*** (df = 23; 1763) | 12.284*** (df = 23; 1765) | 6.735*** (df = 23; 1767) | 12.318*** (df = 23; 1763) |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table D.11: Post Models Summary for Negative Emotions (cont.)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| | Embarrassed (1) | Angry (2) | Betrayed (3) | Powerless (4) |
| Condition: Explicit | 0.159* (0.062) | 0.087 (0.055) | 0.132* (0.062) | 0.082 (0.070) |
| Condition: Private | -0.635*** (0.061) | -0.578*** (0.054) | -0.597*** (0.062) | -0.478*** (0.069) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | 0.135** (0.050) | 0.026 (0.045) | 0.019 (0.050) | 0.117* (0.057) |
| Participant Gender: Female | 0.270*** (0.051) | 0.259*** (0.045) | 0.223*** (0.051) | 0.336*** (0.058) |
| Participant Gender: Other | 0.492 (0.255) | 0.250 (0.227) | 0.448 (0.263) | 0.543 (0.295) |
| Age | -0.076*** (0.019) | -0.054** (0.017) | -0.024 (0.020) | -0.094*** (0.022) |
| Education | -0.050* (0.021) | -0.017 (0.019) | -0.003 (0.022) | -0.044 (0.024) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | 0.092 (0.581) | -0.367 (0.517) | -0.542 (0.586) | -0.101 (0.658) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | 0.341 (0.272) | 0.309 (0.243) | 0.135 (0.275) | 0.331 (0.308) |
| Race: Black/African American | 0.408 (0.251) | 0.320 (0.224) | 0.312 (0.253) | 0.288 (0.284) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | 0.367 (0.267) | 0.417 (0.238) | 0.271 (0.269) | 0.086 (0.302) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | 0.391 (0.245) | 0.313 (0.219) | 0.221 (0.247) | 0.403 (0.278) |
| Race: Other | 0.461 (0.279) | 0.413 (0.248) | 0.228 (0.281) | 0.056 (0.315) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | -0.011 (0.120) | 0.068 (0.107) | 0.053 (0.121) | -0.124 (0.136) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | -0.040 (0.085) | -0.022 (0.076) | 0.020 (0.086) | -0.052 (0.097) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | -0.251 (0.253) | -0.314 (0.226) | -0.237 (0.256) | -0.725* (0.288) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | -0.638** (0.231) | -0.438* (0.206) | -0.457 (0.237) | -0.465 (0.272) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.027 (0.070) | 0.207*** (0.062) | 0.099 (0.071) | 0.016 (0.080) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | 0.004 (0.122) | 0.147 (0.108) | -0.035 (0.123) | -0.100 (0.138) |
| Recognition Politician: No | -0.097 (0.077) | -0.039 (0.068) | -0.061 (0.078) | 0.015 (0.087) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | -0.029 (0.122) | -0.105 (0.109) | -0.159 (0.123) | -0.192 (0.138) |
| Ideology Difference | 0.024 (0.027) | -0.004 (0.024) | 0.012 (0.027) | -0.018 (0.031) |
| Perceived Ideology | -0.019 (0.023) | -0.028 (0.020) | -0.042 (0.023) | -0.038 (0.026) |
| Constant | 4.348*** (0.303) | 4.219*** (0.270) | 4.091*** (0.306) | 4.014*** (0.343) |
| Observations | 1,790 | 1,790 | 1,788 | 1,787 |
| R ² | 0.130 | 0.125 | 0.105 | 0.084 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.119 | 0.114 | 0.093 | 0.072 |
| Residual Std. Error | 1.052 (df = 1766) | 0.938 (df = 1766) | 1.061 (df = 1764) | 1.192 (df = 1763) |
| F Statistic | 11.497*** (df = 23; 1766) | 10.993*** (df = 23; 1766) | 8.966*** (df = 23; 1764) | 7.050*** (df = 23; 1763) |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table D.12: Post Models Summary for Positive Emotions

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| | Enthusiastic (1) | Excited (2) |
| Condition: Explicit | -0.022 (0.057) | -0.061 (0.056) |
| Condition: Private | 0.445*** (0.057) | 0.340*** (0.055) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | -0.025 (0.047) | 0.012 (0.045) |
| Participant Gender: Female | -0.240*** (0.048) | -0.256*** (0.046) |
| Participant Gender: Other | -0.404 (0.237) | -0.083 (0.230) |
| Age | 0.006 (0.018) | 0.040* (0.018) |
| Education | 0.055** (0.020) | 0.030 (0.019) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | -0.937 (0.541) | -0.333 (0.525) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | -0.792** (0.254) | -0.290 (0.246) |
| Race: Black/African American | -0.533* (0.234) | -0.224 (0.227) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | -0.729** (0.248) | -0.238 (0.241) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | -0.689** (0.228) | -0.297 (0.222) |
| Race: Other | -0.576* (0.259) | -0.245 (0.252) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | -0.036 (0.112) | 0.095 (0.109) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.030 (0.079) | 0.121 (0.077) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | 0.477* (0.236) | 0.170 (0.229) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | 0.051 (0.215) | -0.047 (0.209) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.610*** (0.065) | -0.376*** (0.063) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | -0.300** (0.113) | -0.121 (0.110) |
| Recognition Politician: No | 0.308*** (0.072) | 0.203** (0.070) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | 0.021 (0.114) | -0.008 (0.110) |
| Ideology Difference | -0.001 (0.025) | -0.025 (0.024) |
| Perceived Ideology | 0.062** (0.021) | 0.021 (0.020) |
| Constant | 2.445*** (0.282) | 1.895*** (0.274) |
| Observations | 1,790 | 1,789 |
| R ² | 0.145 | 0.085 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.134 | 0.073 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.980 (df = 1766) | 0.951 (df = 1765) |
| F Statistic | 13.072*** (df = 23; 1766) | 7.145*** (df = 23; 1765) |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix D.1.2. Interaction Effects

Table D.13: Pre-Post Models Summary for Leadership (Candidate Gender Interaction)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|--|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Affect Leader (1) | Trust Leader (2) | Competence Leader (3) | Leader Prototypicality (4) |
| Condition: Explicit | -0.304*** (0.060) | -0.387*** (0.058) | -0.363*** (0.059) | -0.455*** (0.052) |
| Condition: Private | 0.074 (0.060) | 0.056 (0.058) | 0.031 (0.059) | -0.063 (0.052) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | 0.100 (0.059) | -0.006 (0.058) | 0.029 (0.059) | 0.037 (0.052) |
| Participant Gender: Female | 0.004 (0.035) | 0.014 (0.034) | 0.001 (0.035) | -0.046 (0.031) |
| Participant Gender: Other | -0.142 (0.180) | -0.028 (0.176) | 0.126 (0.176) | -0.055 (0.154) |
| Age | 0.029* (0.013) | -0.003 (0.013) | -0.001 (0.013) | 0.015 (0.012) |
| Education | 0.012 (0.015) | 0.017 (0.014) | 0.017 (0.015) | 0.009 (0.013) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | -0.141 (0.402) | -0.171 (0.393) | -0.057 (0.400) | -0.291 (0.351) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | -0.092 (0.189) | -0.186 (0.184) | -0.081 (0.187) | -0.276 (0.164) |
| Race: Black/African American | -0.024 (0.174) | -0.130 (0.170) | -0.041 (0.173) | -0.191 (0.151) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | -0.014 (0.185) | -0.104 (0.180) | 0.074 (0.184) | -0.091 (0.161) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | -0.030 (0.170) | -0.105 (0.166) | -0.023 (0.169) | -0.197 (0.148) |
| Race: Other | -0.177 (0.193) | -0.014 (0.188) | 0.018 (0.192) | -0.275 (0.168) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | 0.049 (0.082) | 0.017 (0.081) | -0.066 (0.082) | 0.011 (0.072) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.030 (0.059) | 0.072 (0.058) | 0.020 (0.059) | 0.051 (0.052) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | -0.090 (0.176) | 0.006 (0.172) | -0.186 (0.175) | 0.083 (0.153) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | -0.030 (0.163) | 0.064 (0.159) | -0.141 (0.159) | 0.049 (0.140) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.083 (0.048) | -0.066 (0.047) | -0.037 (0.048) | -0.015 (0.042) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | -0.154 (0.084) | -0.087 (0.082) | -0.117 (0.083) | -0.141 (0.073) |
| Recognition Politician: No | 0.048 (0.052) | 0.052 (0.051) | -0.010 (0.053) | 0.026 (0.046) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | 0.166* (0.084) | 0.151 (0.083) | 0.060 (0.084) | 0.147* (0.073) |
| Ideology Difference | -0.033 (0.019) | -0.063*** (0.018) | -0.043* (0.019) | -0.028 (0.017) |
| Perceived Ideology | -0.003 (0.016) | -0.007 (0.015) | -0.029 (0.015) | -0.005 (0.014) |
| Affect Leader (pre) | 0.650*** (0.024) | | | |
| Trust Leader (pre) | | 0.678*** (0.021) | | |
| Competence Leader (pre) | | | 0.653*** (0.024) | |
| Leader Prototypicality (pre) | | | | 0.776*** (0.024) |
| Condition: Explicit X Candidate Gender: Male | -0.369*** (0.084) | -0.292*** (0.082) | -0.305*** (0.084) | -0.363*** (0.074) |
| Condition: Private X Candidate Gender: Male | -0.143 (0.085) | -0.007 (0.083) | -0.031 (0.084) | 0.021 (0.074) |
| Constant | 1.316*** (0.232) | 1.365*** (0.219) | 1.455*** (0.232) | 1.024*** (0.209) |
| Observations | 1,817 | 1,814 | 1,815 | 1,818 |
| R ² | 0.379 | 0.448 | 0.360 | 0.467 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.370 | 0.440 | 0.351 | 0.459 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.729 (df = 1790) | 0.711 (df = 1787) | 0.725 (df = 1788) | 0.635 (df = 1791) |
| F Statistic | 42.106*** (df = 26; 1790) | 55.731*** (df = 26; 1787) | 38.754*** (df = 26; 1788) | 60.254*** (df = 26; 1791) |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table D.14: Pre-Post Models Summary for Vote Intentions (Candidate Gender Interaction)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | |
|--|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | Intent Vote (self) (1) | Intent Vote (others) (2) |
| Condition: Explicit | -0.458*** (0.065) | -0.837*** (0.065) |
| Condition: Private | 0.084 (0.065) | -0.055 (0.065) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | 0.041 (0.065) | -0.001 (0.065) |
| Participant Gender: Female | -0.046 (0.038) | -0.059 (0.038) |
| Participant Gender: Other | -0.004 (0.191) | -0.139 (0.192) |
| Age | 0.015 (0.015) | 0.035* (0.015) |
| Education | -0.008 (0.016) | 0.004 (0.016) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | 0.004 (0.435) | 0.267 (0.438) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | -0.241 (0.204) | -0.290 (0.205) |
| Race: Black/African American | -0.131 (0.188) | -0.122 (0.189) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | -0.014 (0.200) | -0.150 (0.201) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | -0.180 (0.184) | -0.227 (0.185) |
| Race: Other | -0.036 (0.209) | -0.185 (0.210) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | -0.043 (0.090) | 0.052 (0.090) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.098 (0.064) | 0.015 (0.065) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | 0.246 (0.190) | 0.261 (0.191) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | 0.084 (0.177) | 0.004 (0.174) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.030 (0.052) | -0.126* (0.053) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | -0.235** (0.091) | -0.275** (0.091) |
| Recognition Politician: No | 0.063 (0.057) | 0.125* (0.057) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | 0.183* (0.092) | 0.114 (0.092) |
| Ideology Difference | -0.038 (0.021) | -0.026 (0.020) |
| Perceived Ideology | -0.007 (0.017) | 0.015 (0.017) |
| Intent Vote (self) (pre) | 0.790*** (0.022) | |
| Intent Vote (others) (pre) | | 0.621*** (0.024) |
| Condition: Explicit X Candidate Gender: Male | -0.334*** (0.092) | -0.142 (0.092) |
| Condition: Private X Candidate Gender: Male | -0.066 (0.092) | 0.061 (0.092) |
| Constant | 1.025*** (0.246) | 1.727*** (0.252) |
| Observations | 1,797 | 1,809 |
| R ² | 0.514 | 0.419 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.507 | 0.411 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.787 (df = 1770) | 0.792 (df = 1782) |
| F Statistic | 71.924*** (df = 26; 1770) | 49.495*** (df = 26; 1782) |

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix D.2. Manipulation Check

Appendix D.2.1. Main Effects

Table D.15: Pre-Post Models Summary for Leadership (manipulation check)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Affect Leader (1) | Trust Leader (2) | Competence Leader (3) | Leader Prototypicality (4) |
| Condition: Explicit | -0.554*** (0.044) | -0.586*** (0.043) | -0.573*** (0.044) | -0.705*** (0.039) |
| Condition: Private | 0.0004 (0.044) | 0.043 (0.043) | 0.030 (0.043) | -0.055 (0.038) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | -0.055 (0.036) | -0.099** (0.035) | -0.054 (0.036) | -0.055 (0.032) |
| Participant Gender: Female | -0.001 (0.037) | 0.010 (0.036) | 0.006 (0.037) | -0.047 (0.033) |
| Participant Gender: Other | -0.137 (0.191) | 0.002 (0.187) | 0.100 (0.184) | -0.041 (0.164) |
| Age | 0.026 (0.014) | -0.001 (0.014) | 0.0004 (0.014) | 0.018 (0.012) |
| Education | 0.005 (0.015) | 0.013 (0.015) | 0.010 (0.015) | 0.009 (0.014) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | -0.366 (0.457) | -0.496 (0.447) | -0.411 (0.453) | -0.504 (0.402) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | -0.060 (0.199) | -0.186 (0.194) | -0.005 (0.197) | -0.271 (0.174) |
| Race: Black/African American | -0.033 (0.183) | -0.174 (0.179) | -0.040 (0.182) | -0.232 (0.161) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | -0.021 (0.194) | -0.140 (0.190) | 0.102 (0.193) | -0.113 (0.171) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | -0.031 (0.179) | -0.154 (0.175) | -0.018 (0.178) | -0.236 (0.158) |
| Race: Other | -0.186 (0.204) | -0.063 (0.199) | 0.046 (0.202) | -0.291 (0.179) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | 0.057 (0.086) | -0.009 (0.085) | -0.060 (0.085) | -0.021 (0.076) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.025 (0.063) | 0.098 (0.062) | 0.058 (0.063) | 0.065 (0.055) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | 0.025 (0.204) | 0.046 (0.199) | -0.213 (0.201) | 0.172 (0.179) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | -0.113 (0.175) | -0.096 (0.171) | -0.157 (0.171) | -0.084 (0.152) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.058 (0.051) | -0.038 (0.050) | -0.036 (0.050) | -0.013 (0.045) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | -0.126 (0.089) | -0.036 (0.087) | -0.090 (0.088) | -0.119 (0.078) |
| Recognition Politician: No | 0.015 (0.060) | -0.016 (0.059) | -0.049 (0.060) | -0.021 (0.053) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | 0.227* (0.100) | 0.152 (0.098) | 0.119 (0.099) | 0.173* (0.088) |
| Ideology Difference | -0.033 (0.020) | -0.064*** (0.019) | -0.043* (0.020) | -0.025 (0.018) |
| Perceived Ideology | -0.009 (0.016) | -0.012 (0.016) | -0.037* (0.016) | -0.012 (0.014) |
| Affect Leader (pre) | 0.663*** (0.025) | | | |
| Trust Leader (pre) | | 0.681*** (0.022) | | |
| Competence Leader (pre) | | | 0.647*** (0.026) | |
| Leader Prototypicality (pre) | | | | 0.766*** (0.026) |
| Constant | 1.386*** (0.245) | 1.457*** (0.231) | 1.560*** (0.242) | 1.157*** (0.222) |
| Observations | 1,633 | 1,630 | 1,632 | 1,634 |
| R ² | 0.383 | 0.448 | 0.365 | 0.459 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.374 | 0.440 | 0.355 | 0.451 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.727 (df = 1608) | 0.711 (df = 1605) | 0.721 (df = 1607) | 0.639 (df = 1609) |
| F Statistic | 41.574*** (df = 24; 1608) | 54.319*** (df = 24; 1605) | 38.441*** (df = 24; 1607) | 56.946*** (df = 24; 1609) |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table D.16: Pre-Post Models Summary for Vote Intentions (manipulation check)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | Intent Vote (self) (1) | Intent Vote (others) (2) |
| Condition: Explicit | -0.685*** (0.049) | -1.021*** (0.048) |
| Condition: Private | 0.065 (0.048) | -0.016 (0.047) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | -0.069 (0.040) | 0.003 (0.039) |
| Participant Gender: Female | -0.050 (0.041) | -0.055 (0.040) |
| Participant Gender: Other | -0.002 (0.205) | -0.097 (0.200) |
| Age | 0.019 (0.016) | 0.038* (0.015) |
| Education | -0.009 (0.017) | -0.004 (0.017) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | -0.015 (0.502) | -0.310 (0.492) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | -0.244 (0.218) | -0.308 (0.214) |
| Race: Black/African American | -0.171 (0.201) | -0.229 (0.197) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | -0.024 (0.213) | -0.210 (0.209) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | -0.223 (0.197) | -0.317 (0.193) |
| Race: Other | -0.036 (0.224) | -0.329 (0.220) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | -0.054 (0.095) | 0.066 (0.093) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.137* (0.070) | 0.015 (0.068) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | 0.336 (0.223) | 0.344 (0.219) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | -0.003 (0.195) | -0.058 (0.185) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.030 (0.056) | -0.117* (0.055) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | -0.249* (0.098) | -0.235* (0.096) |
| Recognition Politician: No | 0.050 (0.067) | 0.071 (0.066) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | 0.192 (0.111) | 0.095 (0.107) |
| Ideology Difference | -0.040 (0.022) | -0.026 (0.021) |
| Perceived Ideology | -0.011 (0.018) | 0.004 (0.018) |
| Intent Vote (self) (pre) | 0.777*** (0.023) | |
| Intent Vote (others) (pre) | | 0.617*** (0.025) |
| Constant | 1.180*** (0.263) | 1.890*** (0.261) |
| Observations | 1,615 | 1,625 |
| R ² | 0.506 | 0.440 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.499 | 0.432 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.798 (df = 1590) | 0.783 (df = 1600) |
| F Statistic | 67.857*** (df = 24; 1590) | 52.377*** (df = 24; 1600) |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table D.17: Pre-Post Models Summary for Political Ambitions (manipulation check)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | |
|---|--|--|--|
| | Own Political Ambitions (local) (1) | Own Political Ambitions (state) (2) | Own Political Ambitions (federal) (3) |
| Condition: Explicit | -0.067 (0.038) | -0.034 (0.031) | -0.072* (0.034) |
| Condition: Private | 0.015 (0.037) | -0.001 (0.030) | -0.051 (0.033) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | 0.025 (0.031) | -0.016 (0.025) | -0.002 (0.027) |
| Participant Gender: Female | -0.062 (0.032) | -0.051* (0.026) | -0.100*** (0.028) |
| Participant Gender: Other | 0.055 (0.157) | -0.175 (0.128) | -0.183 (0.141) |
| Age | -0.020 (0.012) | -0.016 (0.010) | -0.015 (0.011) |
| Education | 0.030* (0.013) | 0.027* (0.011) | 0.040*** (0.012) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | -0.251 (0.387) | -0.219 (0.315) | -0.299 (0.346) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | -0.291 (0.169) | -0.328* (0.140) | -0.280 (0.151) |
| Race: Black/African American | -0.250 (0.155) | -0.255* (0.130) | -0.251 (0.139) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | -0.321 (0.165) | -0.258 (0.137) | -0.253 (0.148) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | -0.247 (0.152) | -0.227 (0.127) | -0.217 (0.136) |
| Race: Other | -0.120 (0.174) | -0.167 (0.143) | -0.136 (0.155) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | 0.026 (0.073) | 0.102 (0.059) | 0.062 (0.065) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.036 (0.054) | 0.017 (0.043) | 0.073 (0.048) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | 0.104 (0.172) | 0.203 (0.140) | 0.097 (0.154) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | -0.119 (0.146) | 0.035 (0.118) | 0.002 (0.130) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.128** (0.044) | -0.139*** (0.036) | -0.163*** (0.040) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | 0.007 (0.076) | -0.019 (0.061) | -0.122 (0.068) |
| Recognition Politician: No | 0.073 (0.052) | -0.041 (0.042) | 0.092* (0.046) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | 0.010 (0.084) | 0.020 (0.069) | -0.016 (0.075) |
| Ideology Difference | 0.006 (0.016) | -0.014 (0.013) | -0.018 (0.015) |
| Perceived Ideology | 0.023 (0.014) | 0.036** (0.011) | 0.024 (0.013) |
| Own Political Ambitions (local) (pre) | 0.872*** (0.012) | | |
| Own Political Ambitions (state) (pre) | | 0.894*** (0.010) | |
| Own Political Ambitions (federal) (pre) | | | 0.891*** (0.012) |
| Constant | 0.436* (0.190) | 0.392* (0.157) | 0.437** (0.169) |
| Observations | 1,627 | 1,625 | 1,627 |
| R ² | 0.804 | 0.860 | 0.826 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.801 | 0.858 | 0.823 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.615 (df = 1602) | 0.499 (df = 1600) | 0.550 (df = 1602) |
| F Statistic | 274.066*** (df = 24; 1602) | 409.630*** (df = 24; 1600) | 316.433*** (df = 24; 1602) |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table D.18: Post Models Summary for Negative Emotions (manipulation check)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| | Vulnerable (1) | Ashamed (2) | Anxious (3) | Scared (4) |
| Condition: Explicit | 0.074 (0.054) | 0.180** (0.070) | 0.044 (0.061) | 0.144* (0.070) |
| Condition: Private | -0.385*** (0.053) | -0.694*** (0.069) | -0.445*** (0.060) | -0.643*** (0.068) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | 0.022 (0.044) | 0.122* (0.057) | 0.020 (0.049) | -0.006 (0.057) |
| Participant Gender: Female | 0.260*** (0.045) | 0.262*** (0.058) | 0.249*** (0.050) | 0.407*** (0.058) |
| Participant Gender: Other | 0.238 (0.226) | -0.191 (0.291) | -0.033 (0.252) | 0.493 (0.289) |
| Age | -0.050** (0.017) | -0.144*** (0.022) | -0.066*** (0.019) | -0.149*** (0.022) |
| Education | -0.006 (0.019) | 0.026 (0.024) | -0.032 (0.021) | 0.028 (0.024) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | 0.897 (0.553) | 0.001 (0.713) | 0.348 (0.619) | 0.519 (0.710) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | 0.783** (0.240) | 0.359 (0.310) | 0.407 (0.269) | 0.305 (0.308) |
| Race: Black/African American | 0.670** (0.222) | 0.604* (0.286) | 0.340 (0.249) | 0.383 (0.285) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | 0.658** (0.235) | 0.473 (0.303) | 0.424 (0.263) | 0.112 (0.302) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | 0.731*** (0.217) | 0.516 (0.279) | 0.403 (0.243) | 0.333 (0.278) |
| Race: Other | 0.940*** (0.247) | 0.489 (0.318) | 0.363 (0.276) | 0.377 (0.317) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | 0.097 (0.105) | -0.015 (0.136) | 0.032 (0.118) | -0.042 (0.136) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.013 (0.077) | -0.178 (0.099) | 0.014 (0.086) | 0.151 (0.098) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | -0.443 (0.246) | -0.250 (0.317) | -0.129 (0.275) | -0.216 (0.316) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | -0.269 (0.208) | -0.929*** (0.269) | -0.008 (0.233) | -0.517 (0.268) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | 0.112 (0.062) | -0.188* (0.080) | 0.212** (0.069) | -0.158* (0.079) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | 0.131 (0.109) | 0.080 (0.140) | 0.007 (0.122) | -0.028 (0.140) |
| Recognition Politician: No | -0.102 (0.074) | 0.019 (0.095) | -0.177* (0.083) | 0.022 (0.095) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | -0.098 (0.123) | -0.142 (0.156) | -0.106 (0.136) | -0.069 (0.156) |
| Ideology Difference | 0.026 (0.024) | 0.040 (0.031) | -0.025 (0.027) | 0.023 (0.030) |
| Perceived Ideology | -0.009 (0.020) | 0.003 (0.026) | -0.063** (0.022) | -0.048 (0.026) |
| Constant | 3.684*** (0.268) | 3.777*** (0.345) | 4.202*** (0.300) | 3.861*** (0.343) |
| Observations | 1,608 | 1,610 | 1,611 | 1,608 |
| R ² | 0.088 | 0.153 | 0.089 | 0.153 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.075 | 0.141 | 0.076 | 0.141 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.880 (df = 1584) | 1.134 (df = 1586) | 0.985 (df = 1587) | 1.130 (df = 1584) |
| F Statistic | 6.677*** (df = 23; 1584) | 12.468*** (df = 23; 1586) | 6.742*** (df = 23; 1587) | 12.430*** (df = 23; 1584) |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table D.19: Post Models Summary for Negative Emotions (cont.) (manipulation check)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| | Embarrassed (1) | Angry (2) | Betrayed (3) | Powerless (4) |
| Condition: Explicit | 0.165* (0.065) | 0.099 (0.057) | 0.149* (0.065) | 0.114 (0.073) |
| Condition: Private | -0.707*** (0.063) | -0.625*** (0.056) | -0.658*** (0.064) | -0.520*** (0.071) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | 0.096 (0.053) | -0.012 (0.047) | -0.036 (0.053) | 0.077 (0.059) |
| Participant Gender: Female | 0.269*** (0.054) | 0.259*** (0.048) | 0.226*** (0.054) | 0.346*** (0.060) |
| Participant Gender: Other | 0.371 (0.269) | 0.168 (0.238) | 0.491 (0.276) | 0.569 (0.310) |
| Age | -0.089*** (0.021) | -0.064*** (0.018) | -0.029 (0.021) | -0.106*** (0.023) |
| Education | -0.048* (0.022) | -0.011 (0.020) | -0.001 (0.022) | -0.046 (0.025) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | 0.271 (0.660) | 0.279 (0.584) | 0.108 (0.661) | 0.864 (0.743) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | 0.325 (0.287) | 0.348 (0.254) | 0.209 (0.287) | 0.360 (0.323) |
| Race: Black/African American | 0.444 (0.265) | 0.358 (0.234) | 0.416 (0.265) | 0.389 (0.298) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | 0.429 (0.281) | 0.481 (0.248) | 0.377 (0.281) | 0.225 (0.316) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | 0.446 (0.259) | 0.377 (0.229) | 0.330 (0.259) | 0.509 (0.291) |
| Race: Other | 0.568 (0.294) | 0.472 (0.260) | 0.313 (0.295) | 0.183 (0.331) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | 0.002 (0.126) | 0.080 (0.111) | 0.043 (0.126) | -0.143 (0.142) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | -0.021 (0.091) | -0.018 (0.081) | 0.004 (0.091) | -0.085 (0.103) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | -0.199 (0.294) | -0.223 (0.260) | -0.255 (0.294) | -0.964** (0.331) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | -0.580* (0.249) | -0.360 (0.220) | -0.404 (0.254) | -0.373 (0.285) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.001 (0.074) | 0.234*** (0.065) | 0.129 (0.074) | 0.054 (0.083) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | 0.048 (0.130) | 0.206 (0.115) | 0.0001 (0.130) | -0.075 (0.146) |
| Recognition Politician: No | -0.169 (0.089) | -0.131 (0.078) | -0.090 (0.089) | -0.029 (0.100) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | -0.057 (0.145) | -0.150 (0.128) | -0.232 (0.145) | -0.308 (0.163) |
| Ideology Difference | 0.034 (0.028) | 0.007 (0.025) | 0.028 (0.028) | -0.005 (0.032) |
| Perceived Ideology | -0.027 (0.024) | -0.033 (0.021) | -0.048* (0.024) | -0.038 (0.027) |
| Constant | 4.350*** (0.319) | 4.166*** (0.283) | 3.994*** (0.320) | 3.950*** (0.360) |
| Observations | 1,610 | 1,611 | 1,609 | 1,611 |
| R ² | 0.148 | 0.141 | 0.122 | 0.098 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.136 | 0.128 | 0.109 | 0.085 |
| Residual Std. Error | 1.050 (df = 1586) | 0.929 (df = 1587) | 1.051 (df = 1585) | 1.182 (df = 1587) |
| F Statistic | 11.982*** (df = 23; 1586) | 11.289*** (df = 23; 1587) | 9.549*** (df = 23; 1585) | 7.477*** (df = 23; 1587) |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table D.20: Post Models Summary for Positive Emotions (manipulation check)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|
| | Enthusiastic (1) | Excited (2) |
| Condition: Explicit | -0.065 (0.059) | -0.079 (0.058) |
| Condition: Private | 0.456*** (0.058) | 0.333*** (0.057) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | 0.002 (0.048) | 0.018 (0.047) |
| Participant Gender: Female | -0.264*** (0.049) | -0.287*** (0.048) |
| Participant Gender: Other | -0.401 (0.246) | -0.324 (0.240) |
| Age | 0.001 (0.019) | 0.040* (0.019) |
| Education | 0.052* (0.020) | 0.017 (0.020) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | -0.867 (0.603) | -0.201 (0.590) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | -0.719** (0.262) | -0.153 (0.256) |
| Race: Black/African American | -0.469 (0.242) | -0.038 (0.237) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | -0.660* (0.257) | -0.064 (0.251) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | -0.611** (0.236) | -0.123 (0.231) |
| Race: Other | -0.497 (0.269) | -0.128 (0.263) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | -0.036 (0.115) | 0.130 (0.112) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.012 (0.083) | 0.077 (0.081) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | 0.283 (0.268) | 0.290 (0.262) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | 0.053 (0.227) | 0.076 (0.222) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.626*** (0.067) | -0.430*** (0.066) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | -0.337** (0.119) | -0.187 (0.116) |
| Recognition Politician: No | 0.277*** (0.081) | 0.152 (0.080) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | -0.017 (0.132) | -0.016 (0.129) |
| Ideology Difference | -0.013 (0.026) | -0.029 (0.025) |
| Perceived Ideology | 0.070** (0.022) | 0.032 (0.021) |
| Constant | 2.419*** (0.292) | 1.843*** (0.285) |
| Observations | 1,610 | 1,610 |
| R ² | 0.155 | 0.094 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.143 | 0.081 |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 1586) | 0.960 | 0.938 |
| F Statistic (df = 23; 1586) | 12.639*** | 7.131*** |

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix D.2.2. Interaction Effects

Table D.21: Pre-Post Models Summary for Leadership (Candidate Gender Interaction) (manipulation check)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|--|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Affect Leader (1) | Trust Leader (2) | Competence Leader (3) | Leader Prototypicality (4) |
| Condition: Explicit | -0.369*** (0.062) | -0.437*** (0.061) | -0.432*** (0.062) | -0.527*** (0.055) |
| Condition: Private | 0.073 (0.061) | 0.057 (0.060) | 0.037 (0.060) | -0.073 (0.053) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | 0.105 (0.059) | 0.001 (0.058) | 0.037 (0.059) | 0.041 (0.052) |
| Participant Gender: Female | 0.002 (0.037) | 0.014 (0.036) | 0.010 (0.037) | -0.042 (0.032) |
| Participant Gender: Other | -0.155 (0.190) | -0.002 (0.186) | 0.100 (0.184) | -0.034 (0.163) |
| Age | 0.026 (0.014) | -0.001 (0.014) | 0.0002 (0.014) | 0.018 (0.012) |
| Education | 0.005 (0.015) | 0.014 (0.015) | 0.011 (0.015) | 0.009 (0.013) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | -0.384 (0.455) | -0.491 (0.446) | -0.401 (0.452) | -0.478 (0.399) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | -0.049 (0.198) | -0.178 (0.193) | 0.002 (0.196) | -0.264 (0.173) |
| Race: Black/African American | -0.040 (0.183) | -0.187 (0.179) | -0.052 (0.181) | -0.251 (0.160) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | -0.020 (0.193) | -0.140 (0.189) | 0.103 (0.192) | -0.112 (0.169) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | -0.025 (0.178) | -0.154 (0.174) | -0.018 (0.177) | -0.238 (0.156) |
| Race: Other | -0.174 (0.203) | -0.055 (0.198) | 0.054 (0.202) | -0.282 (0.178) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | 0.068 (0.086) | -0.005 (0.085) | -0.055 (0.085) | -0.015 (0.075) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.021 (0.063) | 0.090 (0.062) | 0.050 (0.062) | 0.051 (0.055) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | -0.018 (0.203) | 0.004 (0.199) | -0.254 (0.201) | 0.115 (0.178) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | -0.105 (0.175) | -0.097 (0.171) | -0.157 (0.170) | -0.087 (0.150) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.068 (0.051) | -0.046 (0.050) | -0.043 (0.050) | -0.022 (0.044) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | -0.137 (0.089) | -0.048 (0.087) | -0.101 (0.088) | -0.135 (0.078) |
| Recognition Politician: No | 0.007 (0.060) | -0.018 (0.059) | -0.051 (0.060) | -0.020 (0.053) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | 0.229* (0.099) | 0.155 (0.098) | 0.124 (0.098) | 0.180* (0.087) |
| Ideology Difference | -0.040* (0.020) | -0.068*** (0.019) | -0.047* (0.020) | -0.029 (0.017) |
| Perceived Ideology | -0.011 (0.016) | -0.013 (0.016) | -0.038* (0.016) | -0.012 (0.014) |
| Affect Leader (pre) | 0.658*** (0.025) | | | |
| Trust Leader (pre) | | 0.677*** (0.022) | | |
| Competence Leader (pre) | | | 0.646*** (0.026) | |
| Leader Prototypicality (pre) | | | | 0.765*** (0.026) |
| Condition: Explicit X Candidate Gender: Male | -0.370*** (0.088) | -0.297*** (0.086) | -0.282** (0.088) | -0.356*** (0.077) |
| Condition: Private X Candidate Gender: Male | -0.147 (0.087) | -0.026 (0.086) | -0.013 (0.087) | 0.039 (0.077) |
| Constant | 1.339*** (0.244) | 1.433*** (0.230) | 1.534*** (0.242) | 1.126*** (0.220) |
| Observations | 1,633 | 1,630 | 1,632 | 1,634 |
| R ² | 0.390 | 0.453 | 0.370 | 0.469 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.380 | 0.444 | 0.359 | 0.461 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.723 (df = 1606) | 0.708 (df = 1603) | 0.718 (df = 1605) | 0.634 (df = 1607) |
| F Statistic | 39.434*** (df = 26; 1606) | 51.047*** (df = 26; 1603) | 36.202*** (df = 26; 1605) | 54.636*** (df = 26; 1607) |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table D.22: Pre-Post Models Summary for Vote Intentions (Candidate Gender Interaction) (manipulation check)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | |
|--|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | Intent Vote (self) (1) | Intent Vote (others) (2) |
| Condition: Explicit | -0.526*** (0.069) | -0.967*** (0.067) |
| Condition: Private | 0.090 (0.067) | -0.063 (0.066) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | 0.044 (0.066) | 0.005 (0.064) |
| Participant Gender: Female | -0.046 (0.041) | -0.051 (0.040) |
| Participant Gender: Other | -0.008 (0.204) | -0.085 (0.201) |
| Age | 0.019 (0.016) | 0.038* (0.015) |
| Education | -0.009 (0.017) | -0.004 (0.017) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | -0.013 (0.501) | -0.283 (0.492) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | -0.236 (0.217) | -0.308 (0.214) |
| Race: Black/African American | -0.182 (0.201) | -0.241 (0.197) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | -0.024 (0.213) | -0.211 (0.209) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | -0.221 (0.196) | -0.322 (0.193) |
| Race: Other | -0.028 (0.224) | -0.328 (0.220) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | -0.047 (0.095) | 0.065 (0.093) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.130 (0.070) | 0.007 (0.068) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | 0.292 (0.223) | 0.319 (0.219) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | 0.003 (0.194) | -0.064 (0.185) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.037 (0.056) | -0.120* (0.055) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | -0.260** (0.098) | -0.242* (0.096) |
| Recognition Politician: No | 0.046 (0.067) | 0.075 (0.066) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | 0.200 (0.111) | 0.099 (0.107) |
| Ideology Difference | -0.045* (0.022) | -0.027 (0.021) |
| Perceived Ideology | -0.012 (0.018) | 0.004 (0.018) |
| Intent Vote (self) (pre) | 0.774*** (0.023) | |
| Intent Vote (others) (pre) | | 0.615*** (0.025) |
| Condition: Explicit X Candidate Gender: Male | -0.316** (0.098) | -0.107 (0.095) |
| Condition: Private X Candidate Gender: Male | -0.051 (0.097) | 0.098 (0.095) |
| Constant | 1.146*** (0.262) | 1.903*** (0.262) |
| Observations | 1,615 | 1,625 |
| R ² | 0.510 | 0.441 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.502 | 0.432 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.796 (df = 1588) | 0.782 (df = 1598) |
| F Statistic | 63.467*** (df = 26; 1588) | 48.582*** (df = 26; 1598) |
| Note: | *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 | |

Appendix D.3. Post-Hoc Analyses

Table D.23: Pre-Post Models Summary for Trust in Institutions and Public Actors

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | Federal Government (1) | Elected Officials (2) | Fact-Checkers (3) | Scientists (4) |
| Condition: Explicit | -0.018 (0.027) | -0.090** (0.032) | -0.058 (0.031) | -0.047 (0.027) |
| Condition: Private | 0.009 (0.027) | -0.019 (0.031) | -0.040 (0.030) | -0.016 (0.027) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | -0.013 (0.022) | -0.012 (0.026) | 0.013 (0.025) | 0.010 (0.022) |
| Participant Gender: Female | -0.055* (0.022) | -0.039 (0.026) | -0.034 (0.025) | -0.016 (0.023) |
| Participant Gender: Other | -0.275* (0.111) | -0.216 (0.132) | -0.049 (0.128) | -0.016 (0.113) |
| Age | 0.019* (0.008) | 0.010 (0.010) | 0.004 (0.010) | 0.010 (0.009) |
| Education | 0.027** (0.010) | 0.021 (0.011) | 0.047*** (0.011) | 0.028** (0.010) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | -0.028 (0.255) | 0.237 (0.302) | 0.304 (0.286) | 0.091 (0.252) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | -0.083 (0.121) | 0.020 (0.144) | -0.164 (0.134) | -0.021 (0.119) |
| Race: Black/African American | 0.027 (0.112) | 0.133 (0.133) | -0.070 (0.124) | 0.042 (0.109) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | -0.0003 (0.119) | 0.096 (0.141) | -0.151 (0.132) | 0.012 (0.117) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | -0.033 (0.110) | 0.076 (0.130) | -0.027 (0.121) | 0.037 (0.107) |
| Race: Other | -0.233 (0.124) | 0.054 (0.147) | 0.046 (0.138) | -0.017 (0.122) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | -0.051 (0.052) | -0.064 (0.062) | 0.041 (0.061) | 0.176** (0.054) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.057 (0.037) | -0.063 (0.044) | -0.031 (0.043) | 0.032 (0.038) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | 0.060 (0.111) | -0.196 (0.131) | 0.034 (0.125) | 0.019 (0.113) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | -0.051 (0.101) | -0.162 (0.122) | -0.122 (0.118) | -0.158 (0.110) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.022 (0.031) | -0.082* (0.037) | -0.060 (0.035) | -0.059 (0.031) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | -0.048 (0.053) | -0.149* (0.064) | -0.112 (0.061) | -0.209*** (0.055) |
| Recognition Politician: No | 0.002 (0.034) | 0.038 (0.040) | 0.006 (0.038) | -0.024 (0.034) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | 0.049 (0.053) | 0.033 (0.063) | 0.047 (0.061) | -0.017 (0.054) |
| Ideology Difference | -0.003 (0.012) | -0.010 (0.014) | -0.002 (0.014) | -0.016 (0.012) |
| Perceived Ideology | 0.026** (0.010) | -0.008 (0.012) | -0.015 (0.011) | -0.010 (0.010) |
| Federal Government (pre) | 0.931*** (0.010) | | | |
| Elected Officials (pre) | | 0.861*** (0.013) | | |
| Fact-Checkers (pre) | | | 0.899*** (0.011) | |
| Scientists (pre) | | | | 0.918*** (0.012) |
| Constant | -0.069 (0.135) | 0.255 (0.161) | 0.220 (0.154) | 0.196 (0.139) |
| Observations | 1,801 | 1,800 | 1,764 | 1,708 |
| R ² | 0.871 | 0.761 | 0.816 | 0.807 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.869 | 0.758 | 0.814 | 0.804 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.460 (df = 1776) | 0.544 (df = 1775) | 0.518 (df = 1739) | 0.456 (df = 1683) |
| F Statistic | 499.521*** (df = 24; 1776) | 235.233*** (df = 24; 1775) | 321.919*** (df = 24; 1739) | 293.013*** (df = 24; 1683) |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table D.24: Pre-Post Models Summary for Trust in Institutions and Public Actors (cont.)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | Journalists (1) | Social Media (2) | Traditional Media (3) |
| Condition: Explicit | -0.094** (0.031) | -0.057 (0.032) | -0.089** (0.029) |
| Condition: Private | -0.070* (0.031) | 0.002 (0.032) | -0.024 (0.029) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | 0.060* (0.025) | -0.018 (0.026) | 0.026 (0.024) |
| Participant Gender: Female | 0.023 (0.026) | -0.010 (0.026) | 0.018 (0.024) |
| Participant Gender: Other | -0.137 (0.129) | -0.203 (0.131) | -0.080 (0.122) |
| Age | -0.007 (0.010) | -0.020* (0.010) | 0.002 (0.009) |
| Education | 0.033** (0.011) | 0.046*** (0.011) | 0.017 (0.010) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | 1.100*** (0.294) | -0.177 (0.299) | 0.101 (0.277) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | -0.043 (0.138) | -0.144 (0.140) | 0.098 (0.130) |
| Race: Black/African American | -0.049 (0.127) | -0.078 (0.129) | 0.144 (0.120) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | -0.042 (0.135) | -0.110 (0.138) | 0.137 (0.127) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | -0.007 (0.124) | -0.138 (0.126) | 0.105 (0.117) |
| Race: Other | -0.013 (0.142) | -0.288* (0.144) | -0.050 (0.134) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | 0.072 (0.061) | -0.065 (0.062) | 0.098 (0.057) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.013 (0.044) | 0.010 (0.045) | 0.014 (0.041) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | -0.196 (0.128) | 0.071 (0.131) | 0.041 (0.121) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | 0.080 (0.123) | 0.029 (0.119) | 0.127 (0.112) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.136*** (0.036) | -0.077* (0.038) | -0.047 (0.034) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | -0.070 (0.063) | -0.151* (0.063) | -0.139* (0.059) |
| Recognition Politician: No | 0.049 (0.039) | 0.070 (0.040) | 0.059 (0.037) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | -0.014 (0.062) | 0.022 (0.063) | -0.004 (0.059) |
| Ideology Difference | -0.0003 (0.014) | -0.011 (0.014) | 0.001 (0.013) |
| Perceived Ideology | -0.007 (0.012) | 0.030* (0.012) | 0.019 (0.011) |
| Journalists (pre) | 0.885*** (0.011) | | |
| Social Media (pre) | | 0.888*** (0.012) | |
| Traditional Media (pre) | | | 0.913*** (0.011) |
| Constant | 0.333* (0.157) | 0.250 (0.160) | 0.024 (0.147) |
| Observations | 1,773 | 1,776 | 1,778 |
| R ² | 0.805 | 0.806 | 0.836 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.802 | 0.803 | 0.834 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.533 (df = 1748) | 0.542 (df = 1751) | 0.501 (df = 1753) |
| F Statistic | 300.349*** (df = 24; 1748) | 302.388*** (df = 24; 1751) | 371.780*** (df = 24; 1753) |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table D.25: Pre-Post Models Summary for Leadership (Interaction with Recognition)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Affect Leader (1) | Trust Leader (2) | Competence Leader (3) | Leader Prototypicality (4) |
| Condition: Explicit | -0.240*** (0.071) | -0.235*** (0.070) | -0.309*** (0.072) | -0.402*** (0.062) |
| Condition: Private | 0.034 (0.079) | 0.129 (0.078) | -0.038 (0.079) | -0.090 (0.069) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | -0.068* (0.034) | -0.100** (0.034) | -0.081* (0.034) | -0.075* (0.030) |
| Participant Gender: Female | -0.005 (0.035) | 0.009 (0.034) | -0.006 (0.035) | -0.054 (0.031) |
| Participant Gender: Other | -0.140 (0.179) | -0.034 (0.175) | 0.139 (0.174) | -0.057 (0.152) |
| Age | 0.030* (0.013) | -0.002 (0.013) | 0.001 (0.013) | 0.016 (0.012) |
| Education | 0.018 (0.015) | 0.021 (0.014) | 0.021 (0.015) | 0.014 (0.013) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | -0.198 (0.400) | -0.239 (0.391) | -0.093 (0.399) | -0.311 (0.348) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | -0.139 (0.191) | -0.176 (0.186) | -0.101 (0.190) | -0.241 (0.166) |
| Race: Black/African American | -0.039 (0.176) | -0.123 (0.172) | -0.043 (0.176) | -0.131 (0.153) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | -0.060 (0.187) | -0.102 (0.183) | 0.034 (0.187) | -0.066 (0.163) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | -0.051 (0.173) | -0.094 (0.169) | -0.035 (0.172) | -0.153 (0.150) |
| Race: Other | -0.243 (0.195) | -0.038 (0.190) | -0.026 (0.195) | -0.255 (0.169) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | 0.081 (0.082) | 0.028 (0.081) | -0.084 (0.082) | 0.011 (0.072) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.043 (0.059) | 0.081 (0.057) | 0.031 (0.059) | 0.069 (0.051) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | -0.016 (0.174) | 0.072 (0.170) | -0.130 (0.173) | 0.163 (0.151) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | 0.007 (0.161) | 0.103 (0.157) | -0.094 (0.158) | 0.103 (0.138) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.064 (0.049) | -0.047 (0.048) | -0.032 (0.048) | -0.004 (0.042) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | -0.122 (0.084) | -0.063 (0.082) | -0.098 (0.084) | -0.115 (0.073) |
| Recognition Politician: No | 0.091 (0.053) | 0.108* (0.052) | 0.039 (0.053) | 0.071 (0.046) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | 0.191* (0.084) | 0.182* (0.083) | 0.082 (0.084) | 0.178* (0.073) |
| Ideology Difference | -0.038 (0.019) | -0.068*** (0.018) | -0.046* (0.019) | -0.031 (0.017) |
| Perceived Ideology | -0.010 (0.016) | -0.012 (0.015) | -0.033* (0.016) | -0.010 (0.014) |
| Real Images: Not sure | 0.239** (0.084) | 0.276*** (0.082) | 0.121 (0.083) | 0.157* (0.073) |
| Real Images: No | 0.054 (0.072) | 0.144* (0.070) | 0.011 (0.072) | 0.028 (0.063) |
| Affect Leader (pre) | 0.645*** (0.024) | | | |
| Trust Leader (pre) | | 0.676*** (0.021) | | |
| Competence Leader (pre) | | | 0.649*** (0.025) | |
| Leader Prototypicality (pre) | | | | 0.776*** (0.024) |
| Condition: Explicit X Real Images: Yes | -0.327* (0.147) | -0.423** (0.144) | -0.331* (0.147) | -0.291* (0.128) |
| Condition: Private X Real Images: Yes | -0.124 (0.117) | -0.052 (0.114) | 0.080 (0.116) | 0.032 (0.102) |
| Condition: Explicit X Real Images: Not sure | -0.443*** (0.095) | -0.510*** (0.093) | -0.370*** (0.095) | -0.444*** (0.083) |
| Condition: Private X Real Images: Not sure | -0.010 (0.100) | -0.121 (0.098) | 0.095 (0.100) | 0.087 (0.087) |
| Constant | 1.322*** (0.242) | 28 1.245*** (0.229) | 1.476*** (0.241) | 0.951*** (0.217) |
| Observations | 1,781 | 1,778 | 1,780 | 1,782 |
| R ² | 0.393 | 0.463 | 0.370 | 0.481 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.382 | 0.453 | 0.359 | 0.473 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.720 (df = 1750) | 0.703 (df = 1747) | 0.718 (df = 1749) | 0.626 (df = 1751) |
| F Statistic | 37.733*** (df = 30; 1750) | 50.122*** (df = 30; 1747) | 34.255*** (df = 30; 1749) | 54.198*** (df = 30; 1751) |

Table D.26: Pre-Post Models Summary for Vote Intentions (Interaction with Recognition)

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | |
|---|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | Intent Vote (self) (1) | Intent Vote (others) (2) |
| Condition: Explicit | -0.373*** (0.078) | -0.680*** (0.079) |
| Condition: Private | 0.009 (0.087) | 0.017 (0.087) |
| Candidate Gender: Male | -0.093* (0.037) | -0.028 (0.038) |
| Participant Gender: Female | -0.048 (0.038) | -0.058 (0.039) |
| Participant Gender: Other | -0.001 (0.190) | -0.145 (0.191) |
| Age | 0.017 (0.015) | 0.037* (0.015) |
| Education | -0.002 (0.016) | 0.016 (0.016) |
| Race: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | -0.089 (0.434) | 0.193 (0.438) |
| Race: Asian/Asian American | -0.309 (0.207) | -0.269 (0.209) |
| Race: Black/African American | -0.166 (0.191) | -0.093 (0.193) |
| Race: Hispanic/Latino | -0.098 (0.203) | -0.149 (0.205) |
| Race: None-Hispanic White | -0.238 (0.188) | -0.204 (0.189) |
| Race: Other | -0.124 (0.212) | -0.194 (0.214) |
| Sexual Orientation: Heterosexual | -0.042 (0.090) | 0.051 (0.091) |
| Sexual Orientation: Bisexual | 0.111 (0.064) | 0.030 (0.065) |
| Sexual Orientation: Asexual | 0.309 (0.189) | 0.326 (0.191) |
| Sexual Orientation: Other | 0.127 (0.176) | 0.054 (0.174) |
| Politician Familiarity: No | -0.031 (0.053) | -0.095 (0.054) |
| Politician Familiarity: DK | -0.224* (0.092) | -0.226* (0.093) |
| Recognition Politician: No | 0.105 (0.058) | 0.161** (0.059) |
| Recognition Politician: DK | 0.220* (0.092) | 0.154 (0.092) |
| Ideology Difference | -0.040 (0.021) | -0.027 (0.020) |
| Perceived Ideology | -0.010 (0.017) | 0.011 (0.017) |
| Real Images: Not sure | 0.127 (0.092) | 0.222* (0.092) |
| Real Images: No | 0.047 (0.079) | 0.109 (0.079) |
| Intent Vote (self) (pre) | 0.780*** (0.022) | |
| Intent Vote (others) (pre) | | 0.618*** (0.024) |
| Condition: Explicit X Real Images: Yes | -0.360* (0.160) | -0.138 (0.162) |
| Condition: Private X Real Images: Yes | 0.132 (0.128) | -0.025 (0.128) |
| Condition: Explicit X Real Images: Not sure | -0.473*** (0.104) | -0.416*** (0.105) |
| Condition: Private X Real Images: Not sure | 0.032 (0.109) | -0.047 (0.110) |
| Constant | 1.097*** (0.256) | 1.522*** (0.263) |
| Observations | | 1,776 |
| R ² | 0.523 | 0.430 |
| Adjusted R ² | 29 0.514 | 0.420 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.782 (df = 1734) | 0.789 (df = 1745) |
| F Statistic | 63.257*** (df = 30; 1734) | 43.910*** (df = 30; 1745) |

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix E. Pretests of Treatment Materials

Table E.27: Pretest 1 (Female 1)

| Setting | Competence | Credibility | Trustworthiness | Leadership | Ideology | Similarity | Realism |
|-------------------|------------|-------------|-----------------|------------|----------|------------|---------|
| Beach | 4.55 | 4.40 | 4.32 | 4.19 | 3.61 | 4.88 | 4.94 |
| Campaigning | 5.49 | 5.19 | 5.21 | 5.43 | 3.35 | 4.81 | 5.91 |
| Community Event | 5.45 | 5.44 | 5.23 | 5.36 | 3.95 | 5.51 | 5.56 |
| Discussion | 5.55 | 5.43 | 5.18 | 5.49 | 3.69 | 5.29 | 5.83 |
| Private Image | 2.97 | 2.91 | 2.97 | 2.99 | 3.23 | 4.92 | 4.35 |
| Grocery | 5.26 | 5.19 | 5.13 | 4.92 | 3.78 | 5.21 | 5.69 |
| Headshot | 5.60 | 5.40 | 5.31 | 5.52 | 4.19 | 4.83 | 4.36 |
| Sexually Explicit | 3.49 | 3.23 | 3.22 | 3.34 | 3.51 | 4.90 | 4.58 |
| Speech | 5.70 | 5.61 | 5.51 | 5.61 | 3.79 | 5.47 | 5.42 |
| Work | 5.56 | 5.45 | 5.22 | 5.38 | 4.06 | 5.38 | 5.43 |

Table E.28: Pretest 1 (Female 2)

| Setting | Competence | Credibility | Trustworthiness | Leadership | Ideology | Similarity | Realism |
|-------------------|------------|-------------|-----------------|------------|----------|------------|---------|
| Beach | 4.60 | 4.49 | 4.68 | 4.22 | 3.51 | 5.25 | 5.25 |
| Campaigning | 5.36 | 5.31 | 5.35 | 5.18 | 3.99 | 5.47 | 5.82 |
| Community Event | 5.62 | 5.69 | 5.87 | 5.42 | 3.94 | 5.70 | 6.14 |
| Discussion | 5.52 | 5.32 | 5.14 | 5.52 | 4.04 | 5.55 | 5.87 |
| Private Image | 3.32 | 3.16 | 3.13 | 3.10 | 3.45 | 5.04 | 4.31 |
| Grocery | 4.53 | 4.64 | 4.74 | 4.17 | 3.77 | 5.43 | 5.61 |
| Headshot | 5.74 | 5.71 | 5.49 | 5.73 | 4.39 | 5.27 | 5.05 |
| Sexually Explicit | 3.81 | 3.61 | 3.58 | 3.40 | 3.51 | 5.08 | 4.53 |
| Speech | 5.56 | 5.49 | 5.29 | 5.70 | 4.12 | 5.87 | 5.29 |
| Work | 5.23 | 5.22 | 5.31 | 4.99 | 3.81 | 5.69 | 5.65 |

Table E.29: Pretest 1 (Male 1)

| Setting | Competence | Credibility | Trustworthiness | Leadership | Ideology | Similarity | Realism |
|-------------------|------------|-------------|-----------------|------------|----------|------------|---------|
| Beach | 4.40 | 4.26 | 4.25 | 3.93 | 3.73 | 5.55 | 4.95 |
| Campaigning | 5.56 | 5.22 | 4.97 | 5.37 | 3.96 | 5.82 | 5.82 |
| Community Event | 5.38 | 5.30 | 5.12 | 5.29 | 3.56 | 4.60 | 5.03 |
| Discussion | 5.51 | 5.12 | 4.88 | 5.33 | 4.29 | 5.62 | 5.82 |
| Private Image | 2.90 | 2.56 | 2.48 | 2.73 | 4.03 | 4.92 | 3.67 |
| Grocery | 4.29 | 4.10 | 3.95 | 3.82 | 3.81 | 4.93 | 5.16 |
| Headshot | 5.33 | 5.12 | 4.77 | 5.14 | 4.14 | 5.56 | 4.55 |
| Sexually Explicit | 2.70 | 2.55 | 2.48 | 2.48 | 3.81 | 4.59 | 3.75 |
| Speech | 5.48 | 5.11 | 4.66 | 5.41 | 4.60 | 5.67 | 5.68 |
| Work | 5.48 | 5.23 | 4.79 | 5.14 | 4.21 | 5.75 | 4.75 |

Table E.30: Pretest 1 (Male 2)

| Setting | Competence | Credibility | Trustworthiness | Leadership | Ideology | Similarity | Realism |
|-------------------|------------|-------------|-----------------|------------|----------|------------|---------|
| Beach | 4.77 | 4.70 | 4.56 | 4.38 | 4.13 | 4.97 | 5.85 |
| Campaigning | 5.66 | 5.56 | 5.38 | 5.49 | 3.80 | 5.61 | 5.70 |
| Community Event | 5.37 | 5.37 | 5.20 | 5.13 | 3.87 | 5.80 | 5.34 |
| Discussion | 5.58 | 5.28 | 4.97 | 5.48 | 4.10 | 5.73 | 5.42 |
| Private Image | 2.92 | 2.54 | 2.41 | 2.63 | 4.21 | 4.92 | 3.65 |
| Grocery | 4.90 | 4.87 | 4.94 | 4.27 | 3.70 | 4.87 | 5.27 |
| Headshot | 5.41 | 5.15 | 4.89 | 5.18 | 4.27 | 5.70 | 4.80 |
| Sexually Explicit | 2.76 | 2.59 | 2.48 | 2.54 | 3.97 | 4.06 | 4.00 |
| Speech | 5.38 | 5.07 | 4.72 | 5.28 | 4.62 | 5.75 | 6.10 |
| Work | 5.32 | 5.21 | 4.93 | 5.17 | 4.04 | 5.87 | 5.92 |

Table E.31: Pretest 2 - Realism of Explicit Images (Responses: 57)

| Person | Sexually Explicit (1) | Sexually Explicit (2) | Sexually Explicit (3) |
|--------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Male 1 | 4.76 | 5.27 | 5.56 |
| Male 2 | 4.48 | 4.69 | 4.94 |

Table E.32: Flyer pretest results (Responses: 60)

| Variable | Mean | Median | Mode | SD | Min | Max |
|--------------------------------------|------|--------|------|------|-----|-----|
| Candidate's Political Ideology (1-7) | 3.33 | 3 | 3 | 1.14 | 2 | 6 |
| Candidate's Political Outlook (1-7) | 4.63 | 5 | 5 | 1.06 | 2 | 7 |